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Elena Gagliasso
The reading group “Evolution & Cognition” was established in March 
2012 at the Department of Philosophy of Sapienza University in Rome. The 
group met once a week to review a scientific paper, chosen from a list pro-
posed by its members. The first members were, in particular, PhD students 
in Philosophy of Science (Laura Desirée Di Paolo, Fabio Sterpetti, Andrea 
Raimondi, Flavia Fabris, Diego Antonio De Simone), but it was immediately 
extended to PhD students and researchers from other disciplinary fields, such 
as Moral Philosophy (Eleonora Severini) and even Palaeoanthropology (Fa-
bio Di Vincenzo). Despite its intense schedule, the group quickly started to 
attract both undergraduate and master students ( Jacopo D’Alonzo, Giuliana 
Pulvirenti, Valeria Di Giovannandrea, and Ivan D’Annibale). More recently, 
it has welcomed new PhD students in cognitive science (Nicole Dalia Cilia), 
history of science (David Ceccarelli, Luca Tonetti), and semiotics (Massi-
miliano Napoli). 
The group “Evolution & Cognition” has born spontaneously, and has 
rapidly developed in a multidisciplinary direction, inspired by the pluralistic 
approach in Philosophy of the Life Sciences. Its interest was mainly focused 
on concepts related to the latest advancements in science and contemporary 
philosophy: in the theory of evolution and cognitive studies, in philosophy of 
biology and philosophy of mind, epigenetics, behavioural studies on non-hu-
man primates, niche-construction, neurobiology, the relationship between 
morality and evolutionary biology, human evolution, and particularly the 
epistemological issues arising from the clash between realist and constructiv-
ist explanations in naturalized approaches. 
The activities of the earlier group encouraged its members to share knowl-
edge and familiarize, often building long lasting friendships. How to make 
available to others the experience, limited in time, of such a group that exist-
ed for pure passion? One of the main difficulties was the annual rotation of 
PhD students. The academic landscape in our country was then (and still is!) 
experiencing a dire recession, whose most direct effect on the group was the 
diaspora of young researchers, many of which have now taken up positions 
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in different universities throughout Europe (Göttingen, Exeter, Nottingham, 
Berlin, and Paris). 
Since the very start, the founding members of “Evolution & Cognition” 
have felt the need to give the group an institutional structure, so as to guar-
antee continuity in time. Thanks to the Doctoral College, coordinated by 
Professor Piergiorgio Donatelli, in September 2013 the reading group was 
transformed into a Permanent Seminar, associated to the PhD Program in 
Philosophy, with Roberto Cordeschi and me as institutional supervisors. Vis-
iting lecturers, professors and young researchers, and graduate students from 
other faculties, as well as researchers and internal PhD students, were the 
invited speakers. 
Roberto was then already in the last year of his life: he had been the 
mentor of several of the founding members of the group. In particular, his 
last student, Nicole Dalia Cilia, ultimately inherited the responsibility of or-
ganizing the Seminar. With Roberto Cordeschi, and then alone, I have been 
a supporter rather than a supervisor: the autonomy of decisions remained and 
remains with the students.
Since the end of 2013, it was decided that two organizers would take care 
of the Permanent Seminar alternating every two years: first, the founding 
members Laura Desirée Di Paolo and Diego Antonio De Simone; then, as 
the Seminar broadened its scope and changed its name in “Ecoevoluzione e 
Cognizione” (with the abbreviation ECOEVOCOG), Nicole Dalia Cilia and 
Luca Tonetti. For the year 2017, Alessandra Passariello and Stefano Pilotto 
will be the new organizers. 
Retrospectively, the Reading Group has represented one of those ger-
minal moments achieved thanks to a shared concert of interests and that 
becomes formative for its participants, acting as a reflexive feedback. Among 
young researchers, this is necessarily «quelque chose d’insolite, ou d’insolent» 
in the words of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1982, p. 35).
Despite its transformation into a more institutionalized form, the Perma-
nent Seminar has increased the contribution of external voices, without giv-
ing up its original freedom of thinking. Just like the Reading Group, the same 
idea was at play: considering the philosophy of science and the history of life 
sciences as a moment of critical, analytical and productive reflection, focused 
on the new insights from the contemporary scientific topics chosen each year. 
Indeed, the practice and the experience within the Seminar became, for 
all those concerned, a place where its members can distinguish the «pro-
pre» from the «non-propre». This has been possible because this group has 
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achieved the rare intent of a ‘true’ seminar: in Michel de Certeau’s words, 
«ouvr[ir] une porte de sortie et de rentrée» (De Certeau 1978, p. 177), of-
fering the means to distance oneself from the original landscape of one’s own 
ideas in order to «y retourner autrement» (ibidem). Such a seminar was, and 
still is today, aimed at fostering critical research on the philosophical issues 
selected each year, going «contre sa formation autant qu’avec sa formation» 
(Bourdieu 1982, p. 6) and trying to avert «ce principe systématique d’erreur 
qu’est la tentation de la vision souveraine» (ibidem, p. 8). 
Indeed, I think that this volume faithfully conveys to the reader the idea 
of this “journey” through different paths that are at the same time explanato-
ry, justificatory, constructive as well as critical, while avoiding the presump-
tion of completeness.
For 2015-16, the organizers Nicole Dalia Cilia and Luca Tonetti chose as 
the main topic the classical analogy between Machine and Organism, pro-
viding PhD students and professors the necessary background for the debate. 
The different issues raised by this powerful analogy are explored in the three 
sections of this book, from a historical and epistemological point of view. This 
Seminar was particularly endorsed by the “Interuniversitary Research Centre 
on Epistemology and History of Life Sciences” (Resviva). At a later time, 
the issues addressed have been also the subject of an entire section (Brain 
and Behaviours in Ecological Frameworks) of the International Workshop for 
the 20th Anniversary of Resviva “Sliding Doors. Prediction and Contingency in 
Biosciences” (February 2-4, 2017). 
Unfortunately, the papers collected in this volume cannot recreate the 
atmosphere of the discussion and of the general interaction “in vivo”. How-
ever, they show the synergy between different disciplines, biology, medicine, 
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, all addressing the problem of the ma-
chine-organism analogy. 
They fruitfully address the transition from the mechanical to the simulative 
approach, as well as the development over time of their explorative method-
ologies: from mechanistic and “atomizing” to informational and virtualizing 
methodologies. Moreover, they allow the reader to retrace the historical reasons 
and the extra-scientific factors behind this influential analogy that, as an “in-
exhaustible engine”, passes through about three centuries of Western science 
and culture.
One long argument that, as the reader will acknowledge, is at the same 
time philosophical, scientific, cultural, and historical; that allows grasping 
12
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each time a point of view, a perspective, but that is never a mere element of a 
summation, rather a node in a network, always open to further changes.
References
Bourdieu P. 1982, Leçon sur la leçon, Ed. de Minuit, Paris.
De Certeau M. 1977, Qu’est-ce qu’un séminaire?, in «Esprit», 22/23(11-12), pp. 176-
181. 
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Introduction
Nicole Dalia Cilia 
Luca Tonetti
In the 1920s the German physician Fritz Kahn (1888-1968) published 
a series of illustrated popular science books entitled “Das Leben des Men-
schen”, devoted to the description of human physiology (Borck 2007; Ei-
lers 2015). The main aim of this work was to represent bodily processes, 
as opposed to anatomical structures, by means of the machine-organism 
analogy. One of its most famous plates (Figure 1), – known as the “Man as 
Industrial Palace” (Der Mensch als Industriepalast) – shows the functioning of 
the upper part of the human body as a set of separated machines, working in 
a sort of production line. It thus brings together, in a peculiar way, medicine 
and technology. The “human factory”, in fact, is composed of steam engines, 
a ventilation system, pistons, a chain of conveyer belts, tanks – each of them 
representing a single function of the body.
Figure 1. Das Leben des Menschen in the Arthur and Fritz Kahn Collection. Source 
book page: https://archive.org/stream/arthurfritzkahn_04_reel04/#page/n220/
mode/1up
14
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Kahn’s mechanical imagery inspired other artists, among them the Scot-
tish sculptor Eduardo Paolozzi (1924-2005), who in 1970 presented the 
Conditional Probability Machine, a portfolio of 24 etchings, divided in four 
sections – “Secrets of Life – The Human Machine and How it Works”, “Man-
ikins for Destruction”, “Pages from the Aerospace Medical Library”, and 
“From Genot to Unimate” –, whose men-machine images were taken from 
the illustrations of popular science journals and books. In particular, the first 
and fourth sections were devoted, respectively, to the functioning of human 
body and to the representation of different kinds of robots, humanoids too.
The machine-organism analogy (hereafter MOA) has played such a sig-
nificant role in the history of Western philosophy and science that its in-
fluence on a variety of aspects of popular culture – ideas, attitudes, images, 
media but also language – and its presence in everyday life of contemporary 
societies can not be exaggerated. Although it sometimes seems to be applied 
naively, the analogy hides complex epistemological issues, concerning the sta-
tus of both organism and machine, as well as the nature of their interaction.
As far as history is concerned, mechanical analogies can be dated back 
to Aristotle. Nevertheless, our goal here is not to retrace in detail their his-
torical evolution. It is worth stressing, instead, that pre-modern forms of 
machine-organism analogies do not always build on a mechanistic concep-
tion of living beings. In other words, mechanical analogies do not necessarily 
imply some form of mechanistic reductionism. This is the case, for example, 
of another artist, one icon of the Western tradition, Leonardo da Vinci. In his 
Anatomical Drawings (preserved in the Royal Library at Windsor Castle) he 
argued that nature had provided living beings with «strumenti macchinali», 
without which some processes, such as movement, would not be possible1. 
This implies that the “dissection” of machines into their constituent parts 
could well serve the study and description of bodily processes; however, since 
Leonardo accepts the traditional notion of the soul, the identification of me-
chanical structures does not mean that the human body in itself is a machine. 
As the artists’ use of the analogy well shows, MOA is fraught with difficulties 
and can not be easily reduced to simple patterns.
Wired bodies. New perspectives on the machine-organism analogy provides 
the reader with some suggestions on these issues, coming from different per-
spectives. Its main contention is that this analogy is not static, but dynamic: 
it strictly depends, in fact, on the way both categories, “machine” and “organ-
1 Windsor, Royal Library, K/P 153r. 
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ism”, have developed over the centuries. It also depends on the interaction 
with other and diverse scientific and philosophical assumptions and models: 
the plasticity of MOA is apparent in the many different points addressed in 
the contributions to this volume. More specifically, the purpose of this book 
is the description of 1) the development of a “mechanistic” framework in 
medicine and biology; 2) the methodological issues underlying the use of 
‘simulation’ in cognitive science; and 3) the interaction between humans and 
machines according to 20th-century epistemology.
The development of a ‘mechanistic’ framework in medicine and philosophy
In the 17th century, a variety of mechanistic models comes to the fore, 
advanced from different perspectives and serving different purposes. In the 
field of anatomy, physiology and medicine, many of them intersect and pro-
ductively interact with other models of the body, including those constructed 
by iatrochemistry. In fact, chemical knowledge and practice did offer viable 
solutions to a number of problems affecting the early-modern ultra-mecha-
nistic machine of the body, among them prominently those concerning an-
imation, thought and nervous processes, and movement. This hybridization 
and cross-fertilization has been neglected, if not completely forgotten, by a 
historiography focusing on neat distinctions and categories (see e.g. Dijks-
terhuis 1961; Debus 1977).
As regards philosophy, the novelty of Descartes’ view is not in MOA anal-
ogy itself, which already existed, but in its dependence, in his works, on a 
more general philosophical perspective. This aims at reducing the physical 
world to geometric properties, such as extension and motion, as a conse-
quence of the dualism of substances – mind vs. matter. Organic processes 
of the body can thus no longer be explained by recourse to the action of a 
soul; consequently, death «never comes to pass by reason of the soul, but only 
because some one of the principal parts of the body decays» (Descartes 
1985, p. 329). The implications of this view in ontology (substance dualism), 
in psychology (the status of the soul and the mind-body problem) and in 
physiology (the action of animal spirits and the function of the pineal gland), 
along with its even more radical developments in the post-Cartesian debate 
(e.g. see Lamettrie and his L’Homme machine), are well known and have 
been recently reassessed (Bitbol-Hespériès 1990; Des Chene 2001; Au-
cante 2006; Caps 2010; Allocca 2012; Scribano 2015).
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However, much has obviously changed since Descartes, and today MOA 
requires a more detailed and thorough analysis. Whenever we say that, in 
some sense, “humans are machines” or “organisms can be explained mecha-
nistically”, we assert something radically different from what was originally 
claimed by Descartes. What is the real object of this analogy: organisms as a 
whole, their parts or, rather, bodily functions? How can the machine serve as 
a model for interpreting the biological phenomena, the cognitive processes, 
or more broadly the social and cultural transformations of the relations be-
tween individuals, and between individuals and the environments in which 
they live?
The history of early modern medicine is interesting here, in that it may 
help clarifying some implications of the philosophical debate. Medicine 
shows, in particular, that MOA can be properly applied to the analysis of 
normal as well as to morbid states of the body. This is evident in the rise of 
the so-called “mechanistic anatomy”, which, pursuing Cartesian mechanism, 
attempted to explain in mechanistic terms the structures and the functions 
of the body parts, both in healthy and diseased conditions. In recent studies, 
Bertoloni Meli explains how the use of mechanical models in anatomy might 
have influenced the understanding of human body; however, it could also 
have allowed physicians to treat morbid states “mechanistically”. In other 
words, physicians could build machines for clinical purposes, i.e. they could 
use physical artefacts or mechanical devices to reproduce morbid operations, 
in order to grasp the natural laws underlying them and find a suitable treat-
ment (Bertoloni Meli 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2016; Bertoloni Meli, 
Wilkin 2008).
Moreover, as Bertoloni Meli himself recognises, the concept of “machine” 
is very broad, since it includes traditional machines (like clocks, for exam-
ple) as well as hybrid ones that are based on chemical processes. This is only 
part of a more general problem concerning the distinction between the two 
medical doctrines, iatrochemistry and iatromechanics: iatrochemistry sees 
the biological and physiological phenomena in chemical terms, interpret-
ing them as processes of “fermentation” and “effervescence”; iatromechan-
ics, conversely, applies the physical laws of mechanics and statics to bodily 
operations. However, as already mentioned, this distinction does not reflect 
the complexity of early modern medicine. A leading representative of iat-
romechanics like Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, for example, adopts chemical 
explanations next to purely mechanical categories to explain the movements 
of the body or generation.
17
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The first two papers in the book, by Guidi and Tonetti, aim at analys-
ing forms of mechanism alternative to Descartes’ celebrate and well-known 
model, in order to show that the notion of “mechanical philosophy” and of 
“machine” are not unitary, and by no means simply reducible to Cartesian-
ism alone. Simone Guidi examines Cureau de La Chambre’s battle against 
Descartes’ mechanical materialism, questioning the structural relation of 
mechanicism to materialism by showing that it can be reconciled, rather sur-
prisingly, with an updated version of ancient hylomorphism. Luca Tonetti 
explores an alternative medical version of mechanicism by describing Gior-
gio Baglivi’s mechanistic pathology. Although he is traditionally considered 
a leading representative of the Italian “iatromechanics”, Baglivi realized that 
diseases can not be entirely reduced to physics, since the morbid states of the 
body are completely different from machines malfunctioning. By taking into 
account von Bertalanffy’s early work, Alessandra Passariello shows that 
the major arguments of early 20th-century organicism against a mechanized 
notion of living entities were both absorbed and overcome by the upcom-
ing cybernetic approach. Organicist arguments thus prepared the ground for 
a substantial reconfiguration of the organism vs machine dichotomy into a 
more complex one, namely, organism-machine vs non-living complex dy-
namical systems. Finally  Mattia Della Rocca reflects on the concept of simu-
lation shared by recent European initiatives like the Human Brain Project. In 
particular, he focuses on how the adoption of an engineering perspective and 
the action of extra-scientific factors, like research policies and procedures, 
influence current neuroscience.
Understanding by building. The use of simulation in cognitive science
Vittorio Somenzi’s paper “Men and Machines”, presented at the Italian 
Congress of Philosophy held in Pisa in April 1967, was one of the first Italian 
contributions on the relationship between organism and machine (Somenzi 
2011)2. Somenzi claims that Descartes, Kepler, Boyle and Leibniz had al-
ready recognized the existence of machines aimed at reproducing not only 
muscular, but also mental work, as exemplified by the working of clocks. In 
the latter case, the clock is not just a tool, but a real machine, which possesses 
autonomy and is able to give a feedback by returning information which was 
previously entered. “Autonomy”, in particular, represents a turning point with 
2 All quotations from Somenzi are translated by the authors.
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respect to 17th-century machines, which released instantaneously the ener-
gy stored in muscles, because it allows the mechanical devices to hide their 
source of energy (ibidem, p. 131). The “hidden engine” has all the information 
«that the automaton would then have performed [...] in different kinds of 
outputs, such as gestures, sounds, writing, and so on» (ibidem), that is the 
process of mental activity simulated by the robot. Other machines perform-
ing mental works, rather than muscular efforts, were mechanical calculators 
or programmable machines like automatic looms, which were developed be-
tween the 17th and 18th centuries.
Between the 1830s and 1870s, the English mathematician Charles Bab-
bage (1791-1871) tried to combine in his Analytical Engine (Figure 2) the 
concept of “program”, which is implicit in automatic looms, with the concept 
of the calculating mechanism of the “pascaline”, a calculating machine previ-
ously invented by the French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal.
Figure 2. Babbage’s Analytical Engine.
Thus the idea was born of a  general-purpose calculator, i.e. of a ma-
chine able to solve very different problems depending on the program 
implemented therein. After almost a century, Alan Turing (1912-1954), 
in his famous paper “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to 
the Entscheidungsproblem” (1936), generalized this idea in a more abstract 
form. Turing’s machines can imitate human deductive reasoning but, ac-
19
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cording to Somenzi, also the «operations characterizing the inductive pro-
cesses and any other mental process, as long as these operations are defined 
uniquely with a finite number of words» (ibidem, p. 132) (for more details, 
see Tamburrini 2002, pp. 29 ff ).
At the engineering level, the predecessors of the first generation com-
puters were mechanical or electromechanical devices. The basic components 
were spring-loaded relays whose operations closely resembled those of or-
dinary switches: they opened and closed a circuit in response to an electri-
cal signal (Cordeschi 1991). With the so-called “electronic revolution” the 
context changes. Since the 1960s, «the construction of integrated circuits 
at steadily rising levels of miniaturization and speed, the so-called chips, 
has led to previously inconceivable results» (ibidem, p. 315). However, these 
technological advances have not produced any change in the structure of 
programs: «even neurons are triggered or not, a nervous impulse travels or 
not» (ibidem). This is the meaning of McCulloch’s brain-computer analogy, 
which inspired the first modern comparisons between “electronic brain” and 
“biological brain” (ibidem).
The American logician Walter Harry Pitts (1923-1969) contributed to 
the application of mathematics to the biological sciences. With McCulloch, 
he proposed the first mathematical model of a neural network based on prop-
ositional logic, aimed at reproducing the same over-all properties of synapses 
(for the McCulloch–Pitts artificial neuron, see McCulloch, Pitts 1943):
The all-or-none character of the discharge of the neurons is precisely analogous 
to the single choice made in determining a digit on the binary scale, which 
more than one of us had already contemplated as the most satisfactory basis 
of computating-machine design. The synapse is nothing but a mechanism for 
determining whether a certain combination of outputs from other selected ele-
ments will or will not acts as an adequate stimulus for the discharge of the next 
elements, and must have its precise analogue in the computing machine. The 
problem of interpreting the nature and varieties of memory in the animal has 
its parallel in the problem of constructing artificial memories for the machine 
(Wiener 2013, p. 14).
McCulloch-Pitts artificial neuron inspired Frank Rosenblatt’s work on 
the “perceptron” (Figure 3), which is defined as a
hypothetical nervous system, or machine […] designed to illustrate some of 
the fundamental properties of intelligent systems in general, without becoming 
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too deeply enmeshed in the special, and frequently unknown, conditions which 
hold for particular biological organisms (Rosenblatt 1958, p. 387).
The perceptron allows a rudimentary form of adaptation or “learning”: the 
network of artificial neurons receives excitatory impulses from other neurons, 
and the weight of each impulse can be adjusted during the “learning period”.
Figure 3. Organization of a perceptron. Source: Rosenblatt 1958.
Somenzi claims that the McCulloch-Pitts model has shown that the hu-
man brain is similar to the Turing machine and that «any Turing machine 
could be realized by means of neurons of which it is composed» (Somenzi 
1967, p. 132). In this way, Somenzi offers a definition of “machine”, namely, 
«a system able to assume one among different states, a list that associates 
each of these states to a particular action, and the rules to switch from one 
state to another» (ibidem). This definition shows how the machine design has 
developed over time, from traditional mechanical devices such as watches or 
looms, towards virtual and computerized machines. The use of these kind of 
machines is now frequently based on «mathematical models for the expla-
nation of human mental activity, as well as for the design of more efficient 
artificial substitutes for our brain» (ibidem, p. 133).
Building on Somenzi’s interpretation, the second section of this volume 
deals with the problem of artificial simulations in current cognitive science. 
In 1943, in one of the most important meetings in the history of cyber-
netics, engineers, physiologists and mathematicians produced the manifesto 
of cybernetics (Rosenblueth, Wiener, Bigelow 1943). Research in this 
field is based on the possibility of considering machine and brain as func-
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tionally equivalent. Since the 1940s, in order to reproduce and investigate 
the mechanisms of cognitive functions, cognitive scientists have followed a 
methodology known as the synthetic method (Cordeschi 2002). Through 
this method, the machine can be used for testing theories, since “mechanical 
organism (or machine)” and “biological organism” (or proper body) seem to 
share some essential characteristics of the investigated phenomenon, reveal-
ing a common functional organization beyond the different physical struc-
tures (Cordeschi 2008). Therefore, the goal of the synthetic method is not 
to reproduce cognitive functions but to test their “mechanisms” on the basis 
of which machines are built. This is possible by comparing the behaviour of 
the machine with that of humans. Obviously, many difficulties arise from 
these assumptions, such as the problem of functionalism, sufficiency test and 
multiple realizability.
Nicole Dalia Cilia analyses the difference between model-oriented sim-
ulation and data-oriented simulation (as in the synthetic method) arguing 
that it is possible to integrate the data-oriented simulation in the first one. 
Giuseppe Boccignone applies this methodology to an issue, emotions, until 
now considered as an exclusive domain of philosophy or psychology. While 
addressing the same question, Valentina Trombetta examines the role 
of emotions and intrinsic motivations through an enactive and dynamical 
framework. Finally, Francesco Bianchini discusses the relationship be-
tween evolutionary biology and AI.
Bodily boundaries and beyond: how do machines extend the bodies and 
their world?
Contemporary science poses new challenges: modelling mechanical de-
vices can be difficult, but managing the interaction between humans and 
machines may pose further problems. The third section addresses this issue 
by adopting as a background recent philosophical trends and debates. Tech-
nology has become a tool for acquiring knowledge as much as a practical 
support, as apparent in the production of artificial prostheses in medicine, in 
rehabilitation equipment, in the assessment for children with learning dis-
ability, in home automation or in tools for large-scale control. The world we 
live in, being largely technologized, is a human product that, in some sense, 
“extends” and enhances our capabilities. Therefore, the third section explores 
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the ways technology can extend bodily, mental and evolutionary boundaries, 
arguing that our body is an extension of our brain, as machines are extensions 
of our bodies. In particular, Lupi and Binda investigate the role of technical 
objects, interpreted as extensions of our body. Fiorenza Lupi focuses her 
paper on Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of technique, overturning the 
traditional relation between machine and organism. The question here is: do 
machines show adaptation, learning and interaction with the environment? 
Elisa Binda addresses the relation among technical objects, organisms and 
environment, according to the analysis by Gilbert Simondon, one of Can-
guilhem’s disciples. Francesco Restuccia shows that Wiener and Benja-
min, although coming from different backgrounds, share the same interest 
about the interaction between human beings and machines, and the same 
concern about the impact of technology on contemporary societies. However, 
the notion of “extension” is supported also by embodied cognition (Shapiro 
2012) and dynamic psychology (Dazzi, De Coro 2001), which reassess the 
mutual relationship between organisms and their environments, in order to 
provide a more situated conception of cognitive processes. Francesco De 
Bei exploits the evolutionary hypotheses developed in recent years by Mi-
chael Tomasello to propose a new interpretation of human-machine sym-
biosis, also taking into account the impact that an environment increasingly 
saturated of technology could have on mental functioning.
Waiting for the day when we can all «journey to a world where robots 
dream and desire»3, we do hope that this volume will continue the fruitful 
discussions which began as a seminar, and will suggest to the reader new 
perspectives on the analogy between machine and organism.
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Mechanism Prehistory and the Strange Case 
of Cureau de La Chambre
Simone Guidi
What does the word “mechanism” mean? Introducing his masterful The 
Mechanization of the World Picture, Dijksterhuis admitted to not having a 
final answer (Dijksterhuis 1961, p. 4 ff ). His work dealt with the entire 
history of natural philosophy, concluding that the mechanization of the 
world «meant the introduction of a description of nature with the aid of the 
mathematical concepts of classical mechanics; it marks the beginning of the 
mathematization of science, which continues […] in the twentieth century» 
(ibidem, p. 501).
Dijksterhuis’ emphasis lays on mathematics, although it is evident how 
such a definition pays the price for placing mechanism’s roots so far back 
in time. Modern science would have been living for centuries in the trail of 
classical philosophy, and most of the philosophers we call “mechanists” could 
not be considered more than followers of the ancients’ footsteps. Further-
more, neither Descartes nor Gassendi applied mathematics to physics, while 
Galileo – who can hardly be defined a “mechanist” (Garber 2013, pp. 13-15) 
– could not be excluded from this category. For mechanism, every physical 
phenomenon, including force, can be entirely reduced to spatial relations, and 
Galileo’s physics leaves many fields out of the reduction to space.
Mechanism is a “theory of everything”, whose attempt is to reduce every 
science to the same, intelligible principles. Consistent with this perspective 
is a simpler definition, as the one we find in Westfall’s The Construction 
of Modern Science (Westfall 1977). For him, the mark of “mechanical” 
philosophy is the overcoming of Renaissance natural philosophy (ibidem, 
p. 30). The core of Renaissance philosophy being the belief in a universal, 
spontaneous animation of matter, the crucial passage toward the rising of 
mechanism would be represented by the homogenization of matter under a 
general notion of “body”.
This is the reason why the very notion of material body should be spec-
ified. While it has represented for centuries a mere potentiality (Aristotle), 
a part of a hylomorphic composite (Aquinas) or a metaphysical substance 
(Avicebron, the Franciscans), in the 17th century it starts to coincide with a 
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geometrical quantitas (extension) that needs matter as a substratum for its on-
tological independence. Such a “general theory” of extended bodies perfectly 
matches Ayer’s definition of mechanism as a system in which «the laws of 
physics can be explained […] by being deduced from the attributes possessed 
essentially by all bodies qua bodies» (Ayers 1988); but it needs extension 
really more than it needs matter.
We might say that for early modern “mechanists” the identification of 
body, extension and matter – as well as the possibility of reconnecting every 
physical phenomenon to its uniformity and substantiality – still finds its 
roots in a metaphysica generalis (if not in a specialis). This seems the reason 
why it cannot be disconnected from a revolution in late Renaissance Aristo-
telianism, especially in the way in which “form” starts to be an efficient more 
than a formal cause of bodies.
In Carraud’s work (Carraud 2002), we discover how, especially in Suárez, 
Aristotelian physics becomes a theory of efficient causation. The late Aristo-
telian world is a hierarchical apparatus of efficient causes, in which the ‘first’ 
One pre-determines nature as an independent whole of ‘secondary’ causes, 
leaving it to its inner execution and rejecting any role for occult qualities 
(Courtine 1990; Des Chene 1996; Coujou 1999; Wadell 2015).
In this context, Jesuit physicists dealt with a different hylomorphism too. 
As stressed especially by Courtine (Courtine 1990) and Coujou (Coujou 
1999), Suárezism reduces his world to the ‘simple’ ontology of the conceptus 
obiectivus (Forlivesi, Boulnois 2002; Esposito 2014). Such a revolution 
also includes matter, to which Suárez acknowledges a subsistence that is 
independent from the form. This real-potentiality of matter leaves to form 
nothing more than an efficient, automatic, shaping action. Thus, for early 
modern hylomorphism, form is more a disposition (and even a pre-disposi-
tion) of matter than its very being, as, by contrast, it was assumed to be in 
Aquinas’ hylomorphism. The efficient action of the ‘local’ causes provides a 
complete, essential explanation of phenomena. In some cases, it also includes 
the biological functions of the body, as in Gomez-Pereira’s Antoniana Mar-
garita (Sanhueza 1997), the most striking antecedent of Descartes’s bêtes 
machines, discussed and criticized already in its very Aristotelian context 
(Suárez 1635). So, can we already label this early modern hylomorphic “au-
tomatism” as a “mechanism”?
Addressing “mechanism” from a historiographical perspective, Roux 
(Roux, 1996, 2013) and Garber (Garber 2013) highlighted how the ex-
pression «mechanical philosophy» does not appear before Boyle. For him, 
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“mechanism” lies in one «Universal Matter common to all Bodies», that is, «a 
Substance extended, divisible, and impenetrable» into which variety is contin-
uously introduced by «Motion». Matter has for Boyle «two Attributes»: «its 
own Magnitude, or rather Size, and its own Figure or Shape» (Boyle 1999-
2000, vol. 5, pp. 305-307). What is new with respect to Descartes, Hobbes or 
Gassendi? Looking at Boyle’s mechanism, we should focus on its epistemology 
rather than on its theorical conclusions. While the early 17thcentury’s “mech-
anists” commonly accepted the belief that physics can be reduced to matter’s 
configuration, Boyle’s is an experimental science in which the experimental 
reality of matter makes metaphysical explanations completely useless. And 
this makes his mechanism completely different from the philosophical model 
developed by Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi, more interested in finding 
analogical “general” explanations rather than in directly observing nature.
Significantly, Boyle enrolls them in the list of his predecessors, as the 
«excellent authors», who have in common «their opposition to Aristotelian 
physics» (ibidem, vol. 5, p. 295). Like Descartes’ and Hobbes’, Boyle’s science 
lies in the refutation of Aristotelian epistemology, as well as in the rejection 
of a way of reasoning that still belongs to the early 17thcentury “mechanists”. 
This is the reason why, in a historical perspective, it is hard to find an actu-
al “break” between a “conceptual” mechanism that is still Aristotelian even 
while it replaces first philosophy with a new, science-friendly, metaphysics 
and with a Boylean experimental mechanism that flows from the breaches 
that this new metaphysics disclosed. Hence, Descartes, Hobbes and Gas-
sendi cannot be considered «different variants of a common paradigm, but 
elements of a pre-paradigmatic stage in the development of the mechanical 
philosophy, part of its pre-history rather than of its history» (Garber 2013, 
p. 26); and a crucial consequence of this assumption is that such a “still-not-
Boylean” mechanism includes a variety of philosophical perspectives, often in 
conflict with each other.
The plexus of prehistori(ographi)c mechanism brings together several 
philosophical schools that, at the end of the 16thcentury, give birth to an 
international debate. It provides a simpler epistemological framework for 
Boylean and Newtonian physics. An exploration in late scholastic physics 
and psychology – like Edward Grant’s – will persuade us of a crucial fact: 
such an overlapping of perspectives has been permitted by the inner trans-
formation of Aristotelian physics and in particular by the crisis of Domin-
ican hylomorphism. For many years, scholastic philosophy had imprisoned 
any reality of matter in the shaping hands of form, and this had allowed the 
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persistence of a metaphysical medium (the form itself ) between logic and 
physical reality. Nature showed a logical behaviour as any natural motion was 
mediated by form, and conversely any natural motion could be described in 
logical terms, because of its inner formality.
The slow recognition of the reality of matter that, also within the Aris-
totelian tradition, starts at the end of the 16th century, directly places physi-
cal phenomena in front of a non-metaphysical logic, an ontology implicitly 
tending to nominalism like the one by Suárez (Esposito 2014, pp. 135-136). 
However, what remains of Aristotelianism when nature is completely de-
scribed in terms of act and potency, efficient causes and actually-nominal 
essences? It is apparent that, starting at least with Jesuits’ eclecticism, Aris-
totelianism addresses nature rather from a logical point of view, based on the 
noncontradiction principle, than by developing new positive doctrines. This 
places hylomorphism closer to the rising “analogical” mechanism of Des-
cartes, Hobbes and Gassendi.
If we look for a good example of such a convergence, we may find it in 
the later work of the French physicien Marin Cureau de La Chambre (1594-
1669). La Chambre was first doctor of Louis XIV of France, a friend of 
Descartes, Campanella and Fermat, and a founder of the French Académie des 
sciences. He is also the author of Les Charactères des Passions (1640-1662), one 
of the most influential treatises of physiognomy in the early modern age, as 
well as of an interesting book of psychology, Le Systéme de l ’âme, published in 
1664, in which he also concludes a famous controversy with Pierre Chanet 
on animal intelligence (Guidi 2015; Scribano 2016).
Starting from his first work, the Nouvelles pensées, published in 1634, 
Cureau tries to revitalize Marsilio Ficino’s vision, founding it on a syncretic 
theory of spirits and light, and merging different elements from Renaissance 
pneumatology (especially Jean Fernel’s), and of early modern mechanism. 
Like Ficino, and consistently with the long tradition of the “metaphysics 
of light” (Grosseteste), Cureau thinks of light as an intermediate between 
form and matter, and of spirit as a third substance between a material body 
and an intellective soul (Guidi 2016). However, La Chambre tries to justify 
his theory within the Jesuits’ hylomorphic framework, as presented in some 
contemporary texts (Liceti 1616, 1641). According to Cureau, light can be 
defined as the act of a diaphanous body, which is its potential substratum. 
Here the form-matter relationship is directly matched to the act-potency 
one, making light a pure act-form, just as the diaphanous is a pure po-
tency-matter of it. Thus, resorting to an (arguably) Dominican distinction 
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between a formal and a local extension of bodies (Guidi 2017), La Chambre 
separates matter and extension, arguing that, even if they are nonmaterial 
bodies, light and spirits have a physical extension. He can thus establish 
that intermediate substances are direct physical manifestations of essences 
and forms, but, at the same time, he thinks of forms as the purest eff icient 
causes in the physical world.
His theory of the intermediate substances is a turning point, from which 
Cureau can assure the ontological reality of catoptrics, proposing (especially 
in his latest works) an interesting mix of panpsychism and mechanism (Gui-
di 2016, forthcoming).
For Cureau, images are physical, extended, but non-material beings, made 
of reflected light rays, and they are, at the same time, pure extended essences 
in space. Thanks to images, Cureau argues, one can explain any automatic 
transfer of information in nature, without resorting either to Aristotelian 
μορφή or to Descartes’ “extreme” reduction of form to “figure”. La Chambre’s 
theory of images, in fact, will meaningfully allow him to reintroduce a strong 
“activistic” view of imagination, proposing a kind of “catoptric mechanism”. 
For him, imagination is a discursive, fully-automatic ratio, in which images 
are physical representations that can take the place of any scholastic species 
intelligibilis. They can also carry out any biological function previously as-
cribed to the vegetative or the sensitive soul.
Starting at least from his controversy with Chanet, Cureau uses images 
to “automatize” animals, affirming their intelligent – albeit preconditioned 
and instinctive – behaviour. Abiding by a Platonic innatism of sorts, Cureau 
puts forward a theory of mental images according to which animals have all 
their actions determined from birth by individual figures, impressed on their 
imaginations. In the instinctive behaviours, «les Images Naturelles» incline 
animals to their usual actions, including any sense-related action.
However, what is especially interesting in Cureau’s theory of images is 
the function they play in his last work, Le Système de l ’âme. Here La Chambre 
explicitly extends their activity to inanimate things, retracing Campanella’s 
theory of sensus: also «dans les choses inanimées», «les Images font toutes 
seules» (Cureau de La Chambre 2004, p. 147). They are able to incline any 
object to automatically act and react, explaining several physical phenomena 
– for example magnetism (ibidem, pp. 135-152) – without using Aristotelian 
forms, as well as avoiding the reduction of nature to a material machine.
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Introduction
The Croatian physician Giorgio Baglivi (1668-1707), professor of anat-
omy and surgery and, from 1702, of theoretical medicine at the Studium 
Urbis, played a pivotal role in the history of eighteenth-century Italian med-
icine (Salomon 1889; Scalzi 1889; Grmek 1960, 1991). His research was 
mainly concerned with the foundation of medical praxis on a Hippocratic 
and Baconian methodology (De praxi medica, 1696), and the definition of 
a fibrillary physiology able to explain morbid states too (De fibra motrice et 
morbosa, 1702).
As a supporter of the application of the laws of physics in medicine, and 
an opponent of ancient humoralism, Baglivi has been traditionally consid-
ered one of the leading representatives of the Italian iatromechanics and, in 
particular, of “fibre medicine” (Ishizuka 2012). This implies that fibres, as 
solids of the body, are the only parts responsible for the diseased condition. 
Morbidity is thus believed to be the result of an imbalance occurring in the 
oscillating fibres of the body.
Numerous 19th-century historians of medicine, such as De Renzi, 
Daremberg, Puccinotti, accepted this traditional interpretation of Baglivi’s 
medicine. In support of this view, in Machine et organisme Georges Can-
guilhem quotes a famous passage from De praxi medica, in which Baglivi 
compares the parts of the body with different kinds of physical devices, such 
as retorts, hydraulic pipes, springs, ropes, and so on:
Examine with some attention the physical economy of man: What do you find? 
The jaws armed with teeth: Are they anything but pliers? The stomach is but 
a retort; the veins, the arteries, the entire system of blood vessels are hydraulic 
tubes; the heart is a spring; the viscera are but filters, screens; the lungs are but 
bellows. And what are the muscles, if not cords? What is the ocular angle, if it 
is not a pulley? And so on. Let us leave it to chemists with their grand words 
of “fusion,” of “sublimation,” of “precipitation” to want to explain and thus to 
38
Luca Tonetti
establish a separate philosophy; it is nonetheless incontestable that all these 
phenomena must be related to the laws of equilibrium, of angles, of cords, of 
the spring, and of the other elements of mechanics (quoted in Canguilhem 
2009, p. 78).
According to Canguilhem, Baglivi proves that mechanistic explanations 
of bodily processes require engines, like springs, next to purely kinematic 
machines, which cannot properly describe the autonomy of organisms, as 
they only transform external energy. Baglivi seems to be a radical Cartesian 
physician, who overemphasises and extends Descartes’ bête-machine argu-
ment to human beings.
However, contrary to what is generally claimed, Baglivi’s physiology is 
not entirely compatible with a strict Cartesian view. Malpighi’s emphasis 
on microstructures and the experiments on dura mater performed at Rome 
with Antonio Pacchioni (Conforti, De Renzi 2009) force Baglivi to “de-
centralize” Descartes’ automaton. Baglivi introduces, in fact, not only differ-
ent physiological processes (see, for example, the role of the nervous fluid 
and the distinction between motus systalticus and motus reflexivus), but also 
a different relationship between the heart and the meninges of the brain. 
Moreover, although he is an opponent of Paracelsus and Van Helmont, 
Baglivi does not exclude the role of chemistry, since for him life depends 
on a «complexum motuum chymico-mechanicorum» (Baglivi 1696, p. 97). 
Finally, while being a radical reductionist, Baglivi realizes that diseases can-
not be completely reduced to mechanics, because they are something very 
different from machines malfunctioning.
Therefore, I believe that the traditional interpretation may support a ste-
reotyped and naive image of Baglivi’s work, and it needs a careful contextu-
alization. In fact, in Baglivi the relationship between physics and medicine 
is much more multifaceted than is commonly acknowledged.
The aim of this short paper is twofold: firstly, I will examine the role 
played by mechanics in Baglivi’s medicine in explaining normal as well as 
morbid states. I will then analyse the distinction between solids and fluids 
of the body. As an advocate of solidism, Baglivi focused both pathology and 
therapeutics mainly on the action of solids. However, fluids seem to still 
play an important role, because they are not easily reducible to the laws of 
mechanics and require rather specific approaches and methods.
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Diseases and mechanical analogies
The “mechanistic turn” in pathology is well exemplified by Marcello Mal-
pighi who, in his reply to Sbaraglia (Cavazza 1997), highlighted the need 
for a “multi-layered analysis” in medicine (Bertoloni Meli 2011), paying 
attention, in particular, to the role of mechanics. Malpighi suggested that 
mechanical devices or artefacts may allow physicians to reproduce morbid 
processes in order to understand – aprioristically – the underlying natural 
laws (Bertoloni Meli 2007, 2012, 2016). In fact, for Malpighi diseases are 
not a freak of nature, but a completely rational phenomenon (Bertoloni 
Meli 2001), whose properties can be deduced a priori from the knowledge 
of the structure and function of the affected bodily part as well as from the 
causes responsible for that disease.
Despite being a disciple of Malpighi, Baglivi follows a radically different 
approach. In fact, the relationship between physics (mechanics) and medicine 
is multifaceted. It is also worth noting that Baglivi never refers to mechan-
ical devices as a means to describe and study morbid states. The only way to 
properly treat diseases is that of performing repeated and systematic bed-
side observations. Therefore, while supporting the importance of aetiology in 
medicine, Baglivi rejects the a priori method of rational medicine.
As already mentioned, one of Baglivi’s main concerns was the crisis of 
medical practice, to which he devoted his first treatise, De praxi medica, pub-
lished in 1696 with the aim of reforming medicine according to a Hippocratic 
and Baconian methodology. By sharing the same research method developed 
by Francis Bacon in Novum Organum, Baglivi listed six idola of medicine, 
namely, those impediments that have prevented progress in medicine. One of 
them, the third, concerns the use of analogies in medicine.
In order not to draw false conclusions, analogies should «relate only to 
things that fall under one Genus, as to Plants and Plants, Minerals and Min-
erals, Animals and Animals, & c. so that all the several Attributes of one 
thing may be verified of the other to which it is compar’d» (Baglivi 1704, 
p. 33). This rule allows physicians to underpin the extension of new find-
ings in comparative anatomy across different species, because analogies are 
built «sub genere Viventium» (Baglivi 1696, p. 28). Moreover, thanks to 
the principle of uniformity, which states that the course of nature continues 
uniformly the same, analogies between machines and organisms can also be 
accepted. In fact, what the mechanics of solids and fluids suggests about the 
animate bodily structures is valid precisely because structures and functions 
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of the body depend on number, weight and size, meaning that they respond 
to physical-mechanical properties. This is the reason why the analogies used 
by Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, Lorenzo Bellini (and Luca Tozzi) are supposed 
to be valid and useful for clinical practice (ibidem). Conversely, Helmontian, 
that is, chemical physicians do not build good analogies, because their com-
parisons are «extra sphaeram mutui praedicati» (ibidem, p. 29).
Baglivi himself used mechanical analogies: for example, in the Epistola 
ad Alexandrum Pascoli (1700), he argues that what allows muscles to con-
tract is the tomentum sanguineum, i.e. the blood flowing between the fibrils. 
Baglivi assumes that blood corpuscles act like many fixed pulleys (or trochle-
ae), around which the fibrils run as if they were strings (or levers). So, muscles 
can be regarded as a combination of simple machines, i.e. as a compound 
machine, whose mechanical advantage is the product of the mechanical ad-
vantages of the simple machines of which it is composed. In this case, given 
that the number of blood corpuscles is almost uncountable, the force ampli-
fication due to the tomentum sanguineum increases exponentially (Baglivi 
1704, p. 402).
Figure 1. Diagram of a fixed pulley. Source: Schott 1661.
However, this hypothesis is untenable, because the fixed pulley does not 
properly represent the motility of blood corpuscles: therefore, Baglivi pro-
poses a second image, by comparing corpuscles with a part of the wheel and 
axle, known as scytala, which is a sort of radial handle or lever that turns the 
wheel round.
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Figure 2. To the left, Baglivi’s diagram of fibre, according to the second 
hypothesis. C and D are scytalae. Source: Baglivi 1700. To the right, diagram 
of wheel and axle. Source: Schott 1661.
In both cases, the mechanical analogy serves as a heuristic tool, through 
which Baglivi can identify the mechanism underlying muscular contraction 
and provide a new mechanistic explanation alternative to the prevailing one 
by Descartes.
Therefore, in order to make good assumptions, physicians should start 
with mechanical principles. However, unlike Malpighi, Baglivi does not rely 
on analogical reasoning in order to construct a natural knowledge a priori. 
Assumptions can promote clinical reasoning but, as they are simple theoret-
ical constructions, they must be rejected when in conflict with experience.
Balancing fluids and solids of the body
Undoubtedly, mechanical analogies help understanding human physiol-
ogy. But does this also apply to pathology? The problem of balancing fluids 
and solids of the body seems to show some limits in the mechanistic view 
on pathology.
In De praxi medica Baglivi recovers the traditional distinction between 
solids and fluids, without supporting the priority of solids over the rest of the 
body as he does in his later works on fibres. If all the diseases depended on 
a defect in solids, then physicians could easily find the causes and derive the 
necessary remedies, by applying the laws of physics. On the contrary, Baglivi 
believes that most of the diseases depend on fluids, whose constituents and 
internal structure are not easily reducible to mechanical patterns.
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The difference between solids and fluids also influences the treatment of 
acute and chronic diseases. Acute diseases mainly affect the body fluids and, 
if not properly treated, they can easily become deadly or incurable. Physicians 
should limit the ministration of remedies and rely on the healing action of 
nature alone. Chronic diseases, however, may depend on the habit of solids or 
on those fluids delaying or failing to complete concoction. In this case, physi-
cians are required to interfere with the natural course of disease, because nature, 
without the action of remedies, may not be able to resolve the morbid state.
In De fibra Baglivi outlines a more accomplished fibrillary theory, by dis-
tinguishing between two types of fibres, membranous and motor/muscular, 
which belong to two distinct but strictly interrelated subsystems, directed 
respectively by the dura mater (dura mater/nervous fluid/membranous fibres) 
and the heart (heart/blood/muscular fibres). Anyway, the identification of a 
microstructure (the fibre) responsible for diseases does not ensure the tran-
sition from physiology to pathology, and, still further, to therapeutics, which 
results from the attempt to combine fibrillary theory and Hippocratism.
This attempt is the main issue of Baglivi’s commentary to Santorio’s De 
statica medicina. Here Baglivi reinterprets the Hippocratic concept of balance 
as eukrasia in terms of an “equilibrium” of forces interacting between solids 
and fluids of the body. Fluids, although depending on the laws of solid me-
chanics, show their own properties and processes, such as digestion, concoc-
tion, fermentation, and so on. Only those who can properly assess the balance 
between both solids and fluids are able to treat diseases (can. XI: «Qui bene 
noverit aequilibrium inter solida oscillantia, & liquida currentia, morbos qua-
mplures recte curare noverit»).
However, this balance is not the exact equilibrium of mechanics or hy-
draulics, but a “proportion” of sorts between solids and solids, fluids and flu-
ids, solids and fluids, which cannot be deduced from the operations of me-
chanical devices, but only derived from clinical observations at the bedside 
and experiments. This is the reason why Baglivi prefers to test in vivo – for 
instance, by means of infusory surgery – because this enables him to evaluate 
solids and fluids simultaneously. In fact, thanks to the intravenous infusions, 
the remedy acts directly on both solids (vessel wall  membranous fibres) 
and fluids (blood).
Baglivi is not able to follow the rigor of mechanics or the axiomatic meth-
od of geometry in order to explain diseases. This does not mean that the 
physical and mathematical principles should be rejected or that they do not 
inform his medicine, but that, in some sense, pathology exceeds them: diseas-
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es are not simply malfunctioning machines. Since physicians are as yet unable 
to consider and quantify all the physical variables involved in a disease, such 
as the diameter of vessels, the force exerted by the heart, or the resistance of 
fluids and solids, machines cannot be useful as a direct reference model for 
pathology. As Baglivi says, the art of medicine can be improved only by use 
and exercise.
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Early Organicism and its Juggling Machines: 
Further from Nature, Closer to Organisms
Alessandra Passariello
Introduction
In 20th century developmental studies, the debate on the epistemological 
equivalence/difference between machines and organisms has a tangled gene-
alogy. The debate first burst onto the scene in the late-1920s with the rise of 
the Organicist movement, which supported the idea that living beings are 
radically different from machines (Woodger 1929; von Bertalanffy 1933, 
1952).
However, I argue that the Organicist standpoint in the machine-organ-
ism debate can only be grasped if we extend our analysis to the broader do-
main of relations between organisms, machines and natural phenomena.
Early Organicism claims a qualitative distinction between biological and 
artificial phenomena in the same way it calls for a clear-cut distinction be-
tween biological and natural (physical-chemical) ones. At first glance, this 
would only appear to separate organisms from the realms of both natural 
and artificial phenomena but, on a deeper look, it implies an epistemological 
similarity between the latter two.
In his earlier texts (1933, 1952), von Bertalanffy assumed an epistemo-
logical proximity between machines and natural systems utilising an older 
concept of machine as «an arrangement of processes» determined by «a fixed 
structure», thus a machine as a physically reducible entity (von Bertalanffy 
1952). Consequently, he drew the distinction between organisms and ma-
chines with the intention of avoiding the physical-chemical reducibility of 
organisms. However, at the time von Bertalanffy was writing, a major shift in 
the relation between machines and natural systems was about to occur.
From the 1940s on, the divide between physical-chemical and artificial 
systems brought to light by Information Theory, Cybernetics and Computer 
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Science, would bring machines, in their renewed form of organized, hierar-
chical dual control systems, closer to organisms (Polanyi 1968).
Von Bertalanffy’s and the machine theoretical conception of development
In the 1920s and 1930s, a geographically distributed network of scientists 
used a common label for their work: “organicism” which meant a different 
biological interpretation regarding
• a new experimental methodology, privileging an enquiry onto the 
entire organism and not on its disassembled parts;
• a new type of causal explanation, between a physical-chemical and a 
supposed metaphysical, vitalistic one.
The rise of the organism-machine debate may be framed within the latter 
epistemological concern for a causal explanation that differs from both physi-
cal-chemical reductionism and metaphysical vitalism. This antithesis was one 
between a material causality, rigorously bound to the explanatory domain 
of physical-chemical laws, and an immaterial causality, calling for literally 
“metaphysical” (beyond physical laws) explanatory principles. One may no-
tice that in this epistemological debate that sets those we may call the “mech-
anists” (and later “neo-mechanists”) against the much-derided vitalists (and 
“neo-vitalists”), the relation between organisms and machines is not the main 
controversial point. Indeed, the main issue is the epistemological proximity/
distance between natural (physical-chemical) and biological phenomena. So, 
when do machines make their entrance?
In his Problems of Life (1952) von Bertalanffy critically points out at three 
“leading ideas” of what was at the time modern biological thought: they are 
the analytical-summative claim, the machine-theoretical and the reaction-the-
oretical ones1 (von Bertalanffy 1952, p. 9). According to von Bertalanffy, 
mechanists adopt an analytical-summative standpoint: they analyse biological 
phenomena (e.g. metabolism, development) by decomposing them into dif-
ferent parts and by enquiring separately into the properties of those parts in 
isolation from each other. Once the properties exhibited by the parts in iso-
lation have been explained, the overall biological phenomenon is supposed to 
1 According to von Bertalanffy, the reaction-theoretical assumption considers the organism as an 
“automaton”, that is, «a passive system, set into action through outside influences, the so-called 
stimuli» (von Bertalanffy 1952, p. 18). This assumption deals with the then current explanation 
of animal behaviour and will not be addressed in the article.
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result from the aggregation of their properties in what is labelled as a summa-
tive way. The analytical, decomposing stance and the summative, aggregative 
one are thus two complementary faces of the same method.
Von Bertalanffy harshly criticizes this methodological protocol both by 
reporting some counterexamples and by giving more general theoretical 
reasons. In the first instance, a telling counterexample is the case of tissue 
culture: «If cells are explanted from the organism and allowed to grow as a 
tissue culture in an appropriate nutrient, their behaviour will be different 
from that within the organism» (ibidem, p. 12). From a theoretical point of 
view, von Bertalanffy suggests that most primary causal factors have to be 
searched for in the relations among the organism’s parts and not in their 
individual properties.
It is worth noting that the rejection of the analytical-summative method 
is not a rejection of the validity of the physical-chemical laws (regularities) 
in biological phenomena. However, according to von Bertalanffy, since those 
laws can only be used as analytical tools, i.e. in explaining the properties of 
isolated organisms’ parts as if they were ordinary physical-chemical phenom-
ena, they are insufficient and, most of all, misleading for the search for an 
explanation of biological phenomena. Von Bertalanffy argues that only the 
formulation of exact laws concerning the whole system i.e. the set of inter-
actions between its components parts, can properly explain biological prop-
erties. But, in his view, this approach doesn’t yet put the machine-analogy 
explicitly under indictment.
Interestingly, in the same text von Bertalanffy couples his criticism of the 
analytical-summative method to another argument against the machine-theo-
retical concept. This second concept, he argues, is shared by both mechanists 
and vitalists and is based on the idea that «order in vital phenomena» can 
be «interpreted in terms of structures», that is, physical-chemical «mech-
anisms in the widest sense» (ibidem, p. 16). The emphasis on a machine’s 
dependence on its structure may sound misleading. We could be tempted 
to see in the term “structure”, here referring to machines, an analogue of 
the concept of higher-level boundary conditions (Polanyi 1968) harnessing 
physical-chemical processes. This interpretation of machines as what later 
became known as “dual control hierarchies” would be entirely anachronistic 
with respect to von Bertalanffy’s text.
Arguably, until the rise of cybernetics (Rosenblueth, Wiener, Bigelow 
1943) scientists conceived of machines as a strict application of physical-chem-
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ical laws: in other words, in a machine «the arrangement of processes can be 
explained […] only by assuming that the processes are directed in the right 
way by a fixed structure» (ibidem, p. 6). According to von Bertalanffy, machine 
functioning is so highly dependent on their physical-chemical structure that 
any alteration of it prevents the machine from achieving its task or, adopting a 
less teleological language, from showing its characteristic properties.
As for the analytical-summative stance, in this case too von Bertalanffy 
brings some counterexamples and clarifies them through more general, theoret-
ical arguments. He resorts directly to Driesch’s well-known experiment on the 
isolated sea urchin’s blastomeres and shows how at the end of their biological 
development a fully developed sea urchin larva is achieved, despite many exter-
nal disturbances altering structure during its embryonic development.
It is worth taking a brief look into Driesch’s experiments on regulative 
embryos. The experiment was performed on fertilized eggs of a sea urchin 
species known as Echinus tuberculatus and consisted in separating the first 
two blastomers (cells resulting from the first zygote’s mitosis) from each oth-
er. Basing his expectations on Roux’s experimentally based concept of “mosa-
ic development” (Figure 1) and on Weismann’s explanation of development 
through the mechanism of “(qualitative) unequal nuclear divisions” (Figure 
2), Driesch expected to observe the production of two half-embryos. How-
ever, to his surprise, at the gastrula stage, development «yielded a complete 
individual of half-size (dwarf-gastrula)» (quoted in Sander 1997a, p. 178).
Figure 1. Mosaic development. Source: Roux 1888.
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Figure 2. Qualitative unequal nuclear divisions. Source: Weismann 1892.
This showed that the eggs of Echinus tuberculatus could regulate their 
development: to Driesch, this meant that cell differentiation is achieved 
through reciprocal interactions, not through a process of mosaic, indepen-
dent development. If, as Roux had hypothesized, development was a matter 
of “independent differentiation” and every cell was only provided with the 
causal factors accounting for its future morphological and functional charac-
ters, those parts of the embryo deriving from the one blastomere could not 
be obtained from the other. Regulation – that is, the occurrence of a causal 
interaction between cells – is not a problem per se but it becomes a major issue 
with respect to the validity of the machine analogy; this is particularly true 
when the “cellular interactions”, which should be firmly anchored to their 
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physical-chemical structure, are robust enough to persist despite a radical 
change in the same physical-chemical structure.
In fact, Driesch’s experiment shows not only that development needs cel-
lular interactions and is thus regulative rather than mosaic-like; it also, most 
importantly, shows that the organism is capable of rebuilding interactions 
even when an experimentally induced disturbance radically modifies its phys-
ical-chemical structure. It is this kind of regulation, intended as a robustness 
to physical-chemical alterations, which, according to von Bertalanffy, makes 
the machine-analogy unsuitable to describe and interpret development. Both 
Driesch and von Bertalanffy refer to this robustness through the word “reg-
ulation” and both of them consider such a regulative capacity not ascribable 
to machines.
In this perspective, it seems to us that, according to von Bertalanffy, 
machines are reducible to physical-chemical laws precisely because they are 
strictly dependent on their physical-chemical structure. Unlike machines, or-
ganisms can cope with alterations in their physical-chemical structure and 
arguably possess this kind of regulative capacity because of systems regulari-
ties which cannot be investigated through the analytical-summative method.
However, von Bertalanffy seems to be aware that regulation, ever though 
a characteristic property of biological phenomena, comes in various degrees 
«ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically» (von Bertalanffy 1952, p. 
17). Given the above-mentioned regulative properties, «organisms are not 
machines»; but they «can to a certain extent become machines, congeal into 
machines» when the relation between their distinctive properties and their 
structure becomes one of a bi-univocal nature. In those cases, fully illustrated 
by the progressive decrease in regulative capacities during ontogeny, minimal 
alterations in the organism’s structure will result in a change in its properties.
Despite this quantitative account of regulation and the implicit possi-
bility of ranking organisms according to a measure of their robustness, the 
relation between organisms and machines remains the one of a qualitative 
distinction. Though organisms face a «transition from less mechanized and 
more regulative states to more mechanized and less regulative ones», this is 
never fully accomplished. The fact that an organism faces a «perpetual break-
ing down and replacement of its building materials» could be interpreted in 
von Bertalanffy’s view as the minimum degree of regulation an organism can 
achieve; of course, the measure a machine (according to the definition of von 
Bertalanffy) would achieve is > 0.
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In other words, as long as machines are investigated from the standpoint 
of their structure, i.e. as a set of physical-chemical ordered events, regulation, 
defined in terms of the constancy of properties in the presence of a change in 
structure, cannot be ascribed to them.
Conclusions
As anticipated in the introduction, a major shift in the concept of the ma-
chine was about to occur at the time von Bertalanffy was writing. Information 
Theory, Cybernetics and Computer Science proposed a new way of looking 
at machines as organized systems with relationships to the physical-chemical 
substrate that were either irrelevant or at the very least interchangeable.
In particular, the advances in Information Theory and Computer Science 
gave birth to a new definition of “organization” in terms of transmission and 
elaboration of a certain amount of information while cybernetics pointed to 
a mechanism, the feedback loop, able to reintegrate, in terms of information, 
the end-result (the elaborated information) of the machine.
In a sense, for machines at least, von Bertalanffy’s concept of “organiza-
tion” as a property that cannot be reduced to physical-chemical interactions 
has been formulated in terms of the concepts of transmission, elaboration 
and control of a finite amount of information. Of course, this shift in the re-
lation between machines and natural phenomena does not necessarily imply 
reducing von Bertalanffy’s notion of biological organization to the informa-
tional/cybernetic/computational organization of machines.
However, I suggest that organicist arguments, eventually rejecting the 
epistemological analogy between machines and organisms, must take the in-
formational/cybernetic/computational shift seriously. This means that taking 
an organicist standpoint today, after the development of cybernetics, implies 
acknowledging that despite eventual differences in the biological and the 
machine notions of organization, organisms and machines are both orga-
nized systems with properties that cannot be explained through the appli-
cation of purely physical-chemical laws. This also means acknowledging that 
machines have successfully jostled in the interspace between the natural and 
the biological, now being further from thunderstorms and closer to organ-
isms (Keller 2008).
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From Brains as Machines to Machines as Brains. 
A Short Historical and Epistemological Reflection 
on the Simulation and “Reverse Engineering” 
of the Central Nervous System
Mattia Della Rocca
The always-varying relationship between science and technology has 
been a classical topic of interest to the 20th century historiography and phi-
losophy of science – probably, in some ways, it has even been a foundational 
issue for both fields. As it is well known, some pivotal works on this subject 
put the dialectics between science and technology at the core of their analysis 
(Schuhl 1947; Koyré 1961; Rossi 1962), drawing the attention of many 
scholars in these fields upon this complex (and often controversial) subject.
However, this relationship has also become a core issue for the histori-
cal and epistemological inquiry on the 21st century life sciences and related 
technologies. Although not all fields in the vast panorama of life sciences are 
equally affected by this trend, one can observe a growing tendency within 
large sectors of present-days biomedicine to shift towards the epistemic and 
methodological assumption that «biology is technology», to quote the title 
of a recent book published by Harvard University Press – a volume signifi-
cantly written not by a scholar from the academic world, but by a CEO of 
Biodesic LLC, a bioengineering firm based in Seattle (Carlson 2010). In 
more recent years, also neuroscience seems to have enthusiastically joined 
this “technological turn” in life sciences, arguing for the benefits of its tech-
nological translation in several application areas, such as industry, medicine 
and everyday-life. Furthermore, this technological turn seems to have deeply 
transformed neuroscience keywords and core concepts, in order to fit them 
into the vocabulary of the new technologies, especially those related to the 
Information and Communication Technology field (ICT). This “technologi-
cal shift” seems to have gained a particular prominence with the advent of the 
“big brain science” projects, the BRAIN Initiative (BI) and the Human Brain 
Project (HBP), both launched in 2013, respectively in the United States and 
in the European Union.
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Within these projects, technology represents more than a simple instru-
ment for gaining new knowledge on the brain. Indeed, 21st century “big brain 
science” projects – and especially HBP – overtly aim to achieve a simula-
tion of the central nervous system by means of “reverse engineering”, which 
should enable the creation of a new class of hardware labelled as “neuro-
morphic” (that is, technology meant to have the “form of the brain”). Re-
verse engineering and neuromorphic computing are fundamental missions 
for the Human Brain Project. The development of neuromorphic computing 
hardware and software represents one amongst the six ICT platforms creat-
ed within the project – i.e. the “Neuromorphic Computing Platform”. The 
Neuromorphic Computing Platform is tightly linked with three other HBP 
platforms, the “Neuroinformatics Platform”, the “Brain Simulation Platform” 
and the “High-Performance Computing Platform”. The first should allow 
neuroscientists involved in the project to analyse and predict brain processes, 
while the second is conceived for implementing and testing brain models 
through neuromorphic computation; the third provides the computational 
capabilities and software needed «to create, simulate and analyse multiscale 
brain models» (Calimera et al. 2013, p. 193). Within this international co-
operative project, reverse engineering of the brain and neuromorphic hard-
ware are often presented as the “next revolution” in neuroscience, a «scientific 
prize» which will catalyse a «methodological paradigm shift» – in the words 
of one of HBP’s leaders, Richard Frackowiak – that will change our under-
standing of both neuroscience as a scientific field and of its object of inquiry 
(i.e., the central nervous system) (Frackowiak 2014).
Lately, however, such an opinion has been repeatedly challenged by neu-
roscientists and by philosophers of science as well; the former criticizing the 
lack of theoretical reflection on the simulated models, the latter denouncing 
HBP project’s optimism as wishful thinking while pointing out the risky 
and “ideological” features of such a theoretical and methodological approach 
(Frégnac, Laurent 2014; Haueis, Slaby 2015; Della Rocca 2015, 2017).
This said, what does it mean to simulate a brain and create a neuromor-
phic hardware? What does the adoption of an engineering perspective in 
neuroscience imply for the contemporary Western discourse about the brain/
mind system? And further, are these technologically-oriented goals actually 
a new perspective in the field of brain research? In this short historical and 
epistemological review of the topic, I will try to provide an answer to these 
questions by exploring whether this “technoscientific” approach to the brain 
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actually represents a novelty in the scientific panorama – and, if it does, in 
respect to what.
Let us turn to “neuromorphism” to provide a first answer to these ques-
tions. The term “neuromorphic” – a neologism to indicate a technological 
apparatus which imitates the structure and the function of the brain – has 
been coined by the US scientist and engineer Carver Mead (born 1934), 
at the beginning of the 1990s (Mead 1990). Contemporary research on 
neuromorphic devices conceptually stemmed from the development of 
Very-Large-Scale-Integration (VLSI) technologies, whose first concept was 
formulated around the early 1970s. VLSI research aimed to create integrated 
circuits by combining thousands of transistors into a single chip – as in the 
case of present-day microprocessors, which combine in one single chip dif-
ferent circuitry as for CPU, ROM or RAM – and emphasized the non-linear 
characteristics of the transistor. This area of research gained a concrete degree 
of feasibility by the pioneering studies, led around the mid-1980s by promi-
nent scientists as John Hopfield, Carver Mead and Richard Feynman (Hey 
1999). Inspired by the research on biological visual systems, Mead took in-
terest in replicating the graded synaptic transmission of the retina, exploiting 
the analogue properties of transistors rather than using them in a classical 
digital way. A year before the creation of the neologism “neuromorphic hard-
ware”, Mead had showed how such an analog circuit shared many common 
physical properties with protein channels in neurons (Mead 1989), and that 
these types of circuits require far fewer transistors to emulate the functions 
of neural systems, compared with the digital ones. In time, neuromorphic 
chips have also implemented some mechanisms that can easily modify their 
electronic “synapses” as soon as data are processed, simulating the brain’s plas-
ticity (Indiveri, Horiuchi 2011).
Conventionally, the early history of the implementation of neural cir-
cuits in electronic models is traced back to the construction of perceptrons 
by Frank Rosenblatt (Rosenblatt 1958), followed by the development of 
artificial electronic retinas by Kunihiko Fukushima (Fukushima et al. 1970). 
However, from the perspective of their “material” ancestry neuromorphic de-
vices originated elsewhere. In fact, they stemmed from the development of 
physical models of the nerve – as Ralph Lillie’s iron-wire model of the 1920s, 
which simulated the biophysics of action potentials in a synthetic system. 
Furthermore, epistemologically speaking, they draw on the identity postu-
lated between biological and electronic components (as materialized in the 
1940s by Kenneth Cole in his “voltage clamp” technique), as well as from the 
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functional equivalence between living beings and machines in the “biomi-
metics” of the early 1950s (as in the works of Otto Herbert Schmitt). Neuro-
morphism, indeed, has a longer history, which predates and flows parallel to 
that of “connectionist” or “post-classical” Artificial Intelligence.
In a similar way, the mid-1980s also saw the official birth of the “reverse 
engineering” concept, which was tightly connected to the development of 
“biologically realistic machines” since its beginnings. The first occurrence of 
the term in overt relation with the human brain can be found in a 1985 arti-
cle by John King McIanahan Stevens – significantly appeared in the pages of 
BYTE Magazine, an American magazine dedicated to microcomputing – in 
which the author asked his reader how to «develop more efficient “sixth-gen-
eration” artificial-intelligence (AI) computers using circuitry copied directly 
from the brain, perhaps using radical new architecture, new hardware, and an 
entirely new logic» (Stevens 1985, p. 287).
 However, the very concept of “reverse engineering” was adopted earlier 
by scholars from mixed backgrounds, such as Edwin Lewis, who in the early 
1960s worked with Richard Reiss and Theodore Bullock on the development 
of a nerve net simulation, which was aimed to achieve a high degree of re-
alism in the electronic simulation of a part of the central nervous systems. 
Lewis’ work and ideas fitted completely in what can be seen as the first phase 
of the “technoscientific” approach to the brain, in which researchers from 
several disciplines – mostly biology, neurophysiology and engineering – tried 
to achieve, with the development of this type of analogies, a twofold goal: on 
one hand, to develop artificial systems which duplicate as closely as possible 
the physiological events which take place in vivo in order to understand more 
about the underlying physiological or chemical events, and, on the other one, 
to use simulation of nerves in studying the manipulation of information for 
the subsequent development of new machines (i.e. computers) (Harmon 
1961). It is worth noting that this “technoscientific approach to the brain” 
experienced its own epistemological crisis – i.e. in the 1970s, when the very 
emphasis on the axonal level became an obstacle to the development of real-
istic simulation. This “crisis” led to a stop in the development of neuromor-
phic technologies until its resumption by Mead and colleagues in the late 
1980s but, at the same time, it bolstered a deeper reflection on the role and 
the limits of brain models, eventually leading to the “plasticity revolution” of 
the late 1980s (Della Rocca in press; Morabito in press).
Rather than a new paradigm in contemporary neuroscience, thus, reverse 
engineering and neuromorphism should be more correctly considered as one 
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of the epistemological and methodological pillars of the field since its very 
beginnings. Therefore, it is difficult to hail them as symptoms of the break-
through of a “methodological paradigm shift”, as promoted and propagan-
dized by 21st century “big brain science” projects’ rhetoric.
In the light of the historical and epistemological inquiry, neuromorphism 
and reverse engineering of the central nervous system appear to be part of a 
long tradition in contemporary neuroscience, and they rather urge our “brain 
society” to reflect on the epistemological and cultural transformation which 
our idea of the brain has undergone in the last decades. In particular, I am 
referring to the shift from the “brain as a machine” analogy (proper of cyber-
netics and scientific popular culture of the second half of the 20th century) 
to the “machine as a brain” one (which today dominates our epistemic land-
scape and technological imagery). Clearly, this epistemic inversion affects 
our scientific categories in neuroscience (especially about modelling), as well 
as the expectations on brain research tout court. Thus, a reflection on this is-
sue cannot be avoided, both for its societal-cultural implications and for the 
relevance it could have on the epistemological debate on neuroscience per 
se. Indeed, the real “prize” for this reflection – to use Frackowiak’s word – is 
a critical acknowledgement of the very advantages and limitations of the 
technoscientific approach to the brain: for what is at stake is the develop-
ment of a historical and philosophical awareness, a necessary step if the sci-
ence-culture-society dialectic wants to avoid another “crisis in (present-day) 
neuroscience”.
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Understanding by Building.  
The Use of Simulation  
in Cognitive Science
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Understand Me or Duplicate Me? 
Levels of Explanation in Artificial Methodology
Nicole Dalia Cilia
The development of new technologies has caused a proliferation of use 
of “machines” in different venues and fields, such as households, medicine, 
and scientific research. A well-programmed machine is able, if not to re-
place humans, to assist them in many tasks and to replicate, and sometimes 
explain, many cognitive processes. Nowadays, however, research is trying to 
reach a more ambitious bigger result. The study of intelligent behaviour so 
as to uncover hidden mechanisms is not any more a goal per se; what is at 
stake is the artificial reproduction of the entire human brain. Contemporary 
neuroscience has seen major research projects aiming to achieve large-scale 
simulations of brain mechanisms, characterized by previously unattainable 
levels of accuracy.
As underlined by Santucci et al. (2016), the key idea of the “simulative 
method” in the artificial sciences (Simon 1996) is «understanding by build-
ing». If we consider the simulative approach at large, including the simulation 
of physical, economic or social phenomena, this method is now widely in use, 
not only in the natural sciences, but in many other domains as well. If we fo-
cus, instead, on the more specific sense in which the simulative approach was 
originally intended in cognitive science and AI – that is, on the idea of build-
ing or reproducing biological intelligence in the form of (adaptive) machines 
– the status of this method is far from being clear or consolidated in the 
scientific community (Arbib 2003; Oudeyer 2010). In order to analyze the 
different methodologies used in the cognitive sciences, they will be grouped 
into two broad families, reflecting two different research goals: model-oriented 
and data-oriented simulations.
Model- and data-oriented simulation
Since the 1940s, in order to reproduce and investigate the mechanisms of 
cognitive functions, cognitive scientists have followed a methodology known 
as synthetic method (Cordeschi 2002). Following this approach, machines 
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are used for testing theories, since a “mechanical organism” (or machine) and 
a “biological organism” (or proper body) seem to share some «essential char-
acteristics of the investigated phenomenon, revealing a common functional 
organization beyond the different physical structures» (Cordeschi 2008, 
passim, my translation). Therefore, the goal of the synthetic method is testing 
the “mechanisms” by which machines are built, not reproducing cognitive 
functions. This is made possible by the comparison between machine and hu-
man behaviours. According to Cordeschi (2000), the first explicit attempt 
to apply the synthetic method was the machine described by S.B. Russell in 
1913, thirty years before the publication of Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bige-
low (1943). This machine was a hydraulic device which simulated a few forms 
of associative learning. The modeling methodology included the three steps 
that characterize today the synthetic method: 1) the formulation of hypoth-
eses; 2) the description of the machine that “incorporated” that assumptions; 
3) the comparison of the results obtained from the machine with those of the 
organism. This machine was «designed so as to embody certain hypotheses on 
the plasticity of nervous connections pointed out at the time by psychologists 
in order to explain the physical bases of learning» (Cordeschi 2000, p. 315).
This was in itself a major shift, because a machine able to modify its be-
haviour in relation to the environment – that is, able to learn – demanded at 
the time an expansion of the machine concept such that it could represent 
a«test […] of a theory, because machine and organism shared some essen-
tial features of the characteristic investigated» (Cordeschi 2008, p. 170, my 
translation).
Another author who stressed the importance of the synthetic method 
was Kenneth Craik. In 1943 he claimed that there is a difference between the 
“analytic method”, which investigates the anatomy and neurophysiological 
structure of organisms, and the “synthetic method”. The latter incorporates 
“general principles” that apply to both living organisms and the machines, 
considering both as complex adaptive systems. Craik, however, also indi-
cated the risks implicit in the method, by emphasizing that models could 
be reduced to mere imitations of the phenomenon, i.e. experiments lacking 
any scientific interest as regards the explanation of the behaviour of organ-
isms, because they did not share with the organisms any common functional 
principle. In fact, even Rosenblueth and Wiener (1945) point out that the 
artifacts could be relevant for the explanation in cognitive science only if 
they were instantiations of a “theoretical model”, which ensured the basis for 
comparison between the natural and the artificial system (see also Tamburr-
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ini, Datteri 2005).The idea of the model as a test for theories is crucial 
here, together with the explicit formulation of the notion of a theory-model 
methodological cycle that would become pervasive in the next step of the 
evolution of the synthetic method.
Figure 1. Methodological diagram for the analysis of simulative studies. 
Adapted from Datteri 2012.
This diagram (see Figure 1) describes the work of the researcher: she ob-
serves a biological behaviour and identifies a particular cognitive mechanism 
that may generate that behaviour (Figure 1, right side). She then builds an 
artificial simulation, or a robot, of the hypothesis of the mechanism under 
evaluation; she compares the behaviour of the simulation with the behaviour 
of natural agents; behavioural concordances and discrepancies are considered 
as the empirical basis for accepting or rejecting the hypothesis, under the 
assumption that the system has thoroughly simulated the hypothesis (see 
Datteri 2012, Grasso et al. 2000). Under a variety of epistemological and 
methodological assumptions (Webb 2008; Datteri, Tamburrini 2007), 
the synthetic method may therefore be helpful in identifying the mechanism 
underlying a particular (observed) behaviour. This may be called a model-ori-
ented use of simulations (Datteri, Laudisa 2016).
Currently, the ambition to build machines able to reproduce the exact 
biological mechanisms faithfully are driven to greater and greater levels of 
biological accuracy. However, nowadays simulations are mostly used for an-
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other, rather different, purpose: they are essential to obtain fine-grained de-
scriptions simply because there are no alternative ways to observe them at the 
same level of detail. The “molecular-level simulations” – as argued by Datteri 
and Laudisa (2016) – «are used as “computational microscopes” (Dror et al. 
2012) to predict the behaviour of ion channels, under a variety of physiolog-
ical conditions» (p. 26). Furthermore, in “evolutionary biorobotics” simula-
tions are useful to obtain a desidered behaviour under a variety of conditions, 
reproducing the sensory-motor mechanisms and the physical structure of 
extinct animals (Long 2012; Plebe, Grasso 2016). The purpose of these 
studies is to obtain data on the behaviour of a system which is hard or impos-
sible to observe through more conventional techniques, not to discover the 
mechanism underlying a particular behaviour. Simulations, in fact, are used 
to mimic conditions that are not empirically testable. This use of simulation 
can be called data-oriented (see also Boone, Piccinini 2016).
However, the main exponents of contemporary large-scale brain sim-
ulation projects are often ambiguous as to whether their goals are on the 
data-oriented or on the model-oriented side. As Roysam et al. (2009) stated: 
«Such simulations will offer more precise methods for testing potential bio-
technology solutions to brain disorders, such as drugs or neural implants» 
(p. 2). Here they suggest that a «computer model of the brain could assist in 
discovering how brain behaviour would change in particular conditions, that 
is to say, under the effect of certain drugs or after connection with additional 
devices. This goal is closer to the data-oriented side, as is the goal of ob-
taining data on the target system» (Datteri, Laudisa 2016, p. 28). Similar 
ambiguities can be found in Eliasmith and Trujillo (2014) claiming that one 
of the reasons to build large-scale simulations is to understand unexplained 
brain disorders, such as autism and addiction. This achievement is closer to 
the model-oriented side, because it consists in the construction of theoretical 
models. Similarly, Kandel et al. (2013) point out that «the […] goal of these 
[…] projects is to gain a better understanding of the anatomical, molecular 
and circuit bases for the logical operations carried out by the human brain» 
(p. 659). In their opinion, the Blue Brain Project «aims to understand the 
human brain by simulating its functions through the use of supercomputers» 
(ibidem). According again to Eliasmith and Trujillo (2014), another goal of 
large-scale simulations is «to develop and test new kinds of medical interven-
tions, be they drugs or stimulation» (p. 3). As we have seen, obtaining data 
on the behaviour of a system which is hard or impossible to observe through 
more conventional techniques would be a data-oriented use of simulations. 
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Eliasmith and Trujillo (2014) also point out that a major purpose of building 
large-scale brain simulations is «to provide a way to organize and unify the 
massive amounts of data generated by the neurosciences» (ibidem). But, as we 
will see, whether and how simulations can really assist in integrating knowl-
edge of the brain may depend on the use of a model-oriented method.
Cognitive science, and particularly modelling through simulations, makes 
use of two methodological families. These two methodologies seemingly have 
different goals: while model-oriented simulations go in search of the mecha-
nism that might explain a cognitive process, data-oriented simulations seek 
to obtain data unavailable through alternative investigative strategies. Is it 
possible to integrate the two methods in order to study a cognitive process?
Levels of explanation in simulative methodology
The two kinds of simulation differ one from the other in the nature of 
their goals. This difference also reflects methodological differences. Accord-
ing to Datteri and Laudisa (2016), the first difference concerns the com-
parison between the behaviours of the artificial and the natural system. As 
previously seen, testing for model-oriented simulations is precisely such a 
comparison. Nevertheless, it «is not part of the data-oriented methodology, 
exactly because there is no data of the natural system to compare with the 
artificial behaviours» (p. 27).
A second difference concerns the degree of corroboration of the simu-
lated mechanism. In model-oriented simulation studies, the artificial system 
must accurately simulate the model under scrutiny – otherwise, there would 
be no reason to bring the behaviour of an artificial system to bear on the 
plausibility of a natural model. Instead, to make a proper data-oriented use of 
a simulation, one has to assume that the model is a good model, otherwise 
there are no reasons to consider the behaviour of the simulation as the be-
haviour that the target system would have produced under such conditions.
In this conclusive section, we will propose two different kinds of integra-
tion between data and model-oriented simulations, in order to provide a way to 
use the data oriented simulation to understanding the cognitive mechanisms.
The first integration can be defined as “vertical”. It refers to the possibility 
of inserting a data-oriented simulation in the methodological cycle (Figure 
1). One of the goals of data-oriented simulations was to obtain data unavail-
able under normal circumstances. Consider again the methodological cycle 
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presented in Figure 1. We may use the data-oriented simulations to produce 
data, thus forming the experimental basis of the model-oriented simulation. In 
other words, the data-oriented simulations could be exploited to generate, in a 
principled way, data to be fed to a model-oriented simulation, which eventually 
tries to explain the mechanism underlying the obtained data. In this case, the 
natural system can be replaced by the artificial system in the methodological 
cycle (Figure 2, right side).
Figure 2. Methodological cycle (Datteri 2012) with two integrations. 
Vertical integration on the right and horizontal integration on the left.
The data-oriented simulation can also play an important role in favoring 
greater biological accuracy. The construction of supercomputers that simulate 
networks composed of billions of neurons is in itself an important techno-
logical advance. However, it is not obvious that the increase of the size of a 
simulation is interesting with respect to the integration or the prediction of 
the behaviour of the brain. According to the synthetic method, an artificial 
simulation would capture all and only the causally relevant factors for the 
production of the investigated behaviour (Boccignone, Cordeschi 2012). 
One of the unresolved problems of the synthetic method is underdetermi-
nation. It is possible, at least in principle, to generate material (simulation) 
models equivalent in performance (two machines will have the same per-
formance). How, then, may we choose the one that really explains the in-
vestigated cognitive mechanism? “Horizontal” integration could respond to 
such question. As shown in Figure 2 (left side) the data-oriented simulations 
could serve as the simulative counterpart, in the case of underdetermination, 
in order to verify the working hypothesis underlying alternative simulations 
(model-oriented). In this case, if a data-oriented simulation is comparable, in 
performance, to the model-oriented simulation, the researcher should be en-
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couraged to make the cognitive mechanism more explicit and to compare the 
underlying algorithmic processes with those of a data-oriented simulation. 
However, this does not imply that a simulation with greater biological accu-
racy is, necessarily, more suitable to explain the investigated cognitive process. 
In brief, the integration of the two methodologies seems possible even if the 
goal were understand me and not only duplicate me.
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Take Another Little Piece of my Heart: 
A Note on Bridging Cognition and Emotions
Giuseppe Boccignone
Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges sci-
ence to be more reflective. This markedly occurred along the “discovery of 
the artificial” (Cordeschi 2002): in the early days of Cybernetics and Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI) researchers aimed at making machines more cognizant 
while setting up a framework to better understand human intelligence.
By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, whereas AI has be-
come more concerned with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (ma-
chine) learning, reasoning, vision, and action. As a matter of fact, the field 
suffers from a chasm between two formerly integrated aspects. One is the 
engineering endeavour involving the development of tools, e.g., autono-
mous systems for driving cars as well as software for semantic information 
retrieval. The other is the philosophical debate that tries to answer ques-
tions concerning the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can 
indeed be crucial in developing a deeper understanding of minds.
An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Tra-
ditionally, computer science, psychological and philosophical research have 
been compelled to investigate mental processes that do not involve mood, 
emotions and feelings, in spite of Simon’s early caveat (Simon 1967) that 
a general theory of cognition must incorporate the influence of emotion.
Given recent neurobiological findings and technological advances, the 
time is ripe to seriously weigh this promising, albeit controversial, opportunity.
In the heart of cognition
Affective neuroscience (Dalgleish et al. 2009, pp. 355-368) is helping 
us understand the neural circuitry that underlies emotional experience. 
It integrates functional neuroimaging, behavioural experiments, electro-
physiological recordings, animal and human lesion studies and behavioural 
experiments striving to understand emotion at the neurobiological and 
psychological levels. Conflicting explanations at the psychological level, 
e.g. basic emotions vs. appraisal theories, find a novel synthesis at the neu-
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robiological level. One outstanding example is Damasio’s work (Damasio 
1994, 1999).
Taking stock of such results, affective computing (Picard 2000) is 
dealing with artificial agents that aim at instantiating the ability to 1) 
recognize emotion, 2) express emotion, 3) “have emotions”, the latter be-
ing the hardest task. So far, most current research focuses on 1) and 2), 
whereby machine learning-based affect detection plays a prominent role 
(Calvo, D’Mello 2010). In order to provide a thorough discussion of 
these aspects, we start by making clear the modelling strategy we adopt 
from now on.
Given a system (human observer) and its behaviour (e.g. facial expres-
sion, gaze shifts), together with available knowledge (psychological/neuro-
biological theories and descriptions, experiments and measurements), we 
set up a computational theory (Marr 1982) formalized in terms of Bayes-
ian theory (Boccignone, Cordeschi 2007). More precisely, we draw on 
the Bayesian framework of Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGM) (Bish-
op 2006). In brief, by exploiting knowledge and constraints available both 
at the psychological and at the neurobiological description levels: 1) we 
identify the essential random variables (RVs) that ground the probabilis-
tic model; 2) we encode the statistical dependencies between RVs in the 
PGM structure.
Coming back to the issue of dealing with the problem of affective ex-
pression generation/detection, one modelling example is presented in Fig-
ure 1. The time-varying RVs, E(t) and F(t) stand for the latent affective 
state of an agent and the facial expression induced by such state at time 
t, respectively; such RV’s are represented by graph nodes. The structural 
dependency (arrow) E(t) → F(t) captures the statistical dependency of 
F(t) on E(t), quantified via the conditional probability P(F(t) | E(t)). The 
model is generative: P(F(t) | E(t)) specifies the likelihood of generating 
an expression (by sampling) under a given affective state. The recognition 
problem (inferring the most plausible affective state given an observed 
facial expression), boils down to “inverting the arrows” by computing the 
posterior probability P(E(t) | F(t)) via Bayes’ rule. If E(t) spans a discrete 
affective state-space, the model can account for a large number of com-
putational models based on discrete theories á la Ekman (Ekman 1993, 
p. 384); if the space is continuous (e.g., specified via valence/arousal di-
mensions), it is suitable to cope with Russell’s core affect theory (Russell 
2003, p. 145).
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Figure 1. Modelling affective facial expression: a) the PGM models the 
dependency of the observed expression under the current affect state (discrete 
or continuous); b) the model represents a possible factorization of the joint 
probability P(F(t), E(t)).
Yet, the actual challenge is designing artificial agents that “have emotion” 
and use it for making decisions. Indeed, neurological studies indicate that 
decision-making without emotion can be impaired. Damasio’s findings point 
to such an essential role of emotions (Damasio 1994).
It goes without saying, modelling emotion at the most general level is 
a mind-blowing endeavour for current research. Thus, we will focus on the 
integration of emotion with cognitive behaviour (Pessoa 2008) by drawing 
on the minimalist case of active sensing.
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Where to look next?
Among the variety of active sensing behaviours, oculomotor behaviour 
(saccades, pursuit, fixational movements) is the least energy process. Though 
minimal, from a theoretical standpoint, a gaze shift action can be considered 
as the result of a decision-making process (conscious or unconscious) (Yang 
et al. 2016).
Such process can be modelled through the perception-action loop as a 
dynamic PGM (unfolded in time, top of Figure 2): I(t) denotes the stimulus, 
e.g. a time varying scene, and rF (t) is the point of gaze (center of the fovea) 
at time t; A(t) is the ensemble of RVs defining the oculomotor action setting 
(e.g., maintain current fixation or saccade in a certain direction); W(t) stands 
for the ensemble of RVs (e.g., features, objects) characterising the scene as 
actively perceived by gazing the stimulus at point rF ; G summarizes the 
given goal (e.g, search for a kid). The action setting dynamics A(t) → A(t 
+ 1) and the scene perception dynamics W(t) → W(t + 1) are intertwined 
with one another through the gaze shift rF (t) → rF (t + 1). The actual shift 
is recovered as the statistical decision of selecting a particular gaze location 
with probability P(rF (t + 1) | A(t),W(t), rF (t)), so to maximize the expected 
payoff under G, the current goal1.
Perceptual decision-making calls for the notions of value and reward 
(Yang et al. 2016) that, in turn, pave the way to bringing emotions into 
the loop (Boccignone 2016). At the neurobiological level, it has been made 
clear that, crucially, cognitive (perceptual) and emotional contributions can-
not be separated (Pessoa 2008), as outlined in Figure 2 (centre).
Indeed, there is a large body of evidence that responses from visual cor-
tex reflecting stimulus significance are the result of simultaneous top-down 
modulation from fronto-parietal attentional regions and emotional modu-
lation from the amygdala and the posterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The 
affective value attributed to a stimulus – either consciously or unconscious-
ly – drives attention and enhances the processing of emotionally modulated 
information (much like the physical salience of the stimulus), while exog-
enously driven attention influences the outcome of affectively significant 
stimuli (ibidem). At the same time, the cognitive control system (lateral 
prefrontal cortex, LPFC, anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) guides behaviour 
while handling goal-related information; action strategies incorporate val-
1 For different instantiations of the model, see Clavelli et al. 2014, and Napoletano et al. 2015.
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ue through the mediation of the nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, and the 
OFC. Basal forebrain cholinergic neurons provide regulation of arousal and 
attention while dopamine neurons located in the ventral tegmental area 
(vTA) modulate the prediction and expectation of future rewards (ibidem).
It is worth noting that neurobiological evidence is relevant for model-
ling purposes, if we surmise a certain degree of association between the neu-
robiological and the behavioural levels. We will further comment on this 
point in the final section of this note, but briefly, we assume that processes 
that support behaviour are implemented by the interaction of multiple ar-
eas (networks), which are dynamically recruited into multi-region assemblies 
(no “necessary and sufficient” brain regions). In this perspective, we draw on 
Damasio’s cleavage between emotions and feelings, which are the first person 
experience of the corresponding emotion (Damasio 1994). An emotion is 
a neural reaction to a certain stimulus, realised by a complex ensemble of 
neural activations in the brain (internal emotional state). The latter often are 
preparations for (muscular, visceral) actions (facial expressions, heart rate in-
crease, etc.), as a consequence the body will be modified into an “observable” 
emotional body state. Thus, we introduce the RV F(t) standing for visceral 
responses (e.g., heart rate, dermal response) that can be gauged via physio-
logical measurement (ECG, skin conductance, etc.). Note in Figure 2 (centre 
panel) the central role of the amygdala and the OFC. Their tight interaction 
provides a suitable ground (Salzman, Fusi 2010, p. 173) for representing, 
at the psychological level, the core affect dimensions (Russell 2003). Core 
affect can then be functionally modelled as a latent space (Vitale et al. 2014) 
– see Figure 1 – spanned by E(t). In addition, C(t) indexes a higher cogni-
tive level of interest. As a result, the original PGM is modified in the PGM 
shown at the bottom of the same figure.
Due to limitation of space, we are not entering details about software/
hardware implementations. As to algorithms, a viable solution to provide 
a simulation of the model is that of exploiting the huge number of state-
of-the-art machine learning algorithms (Bishop 2006). Learning and in-
ference on PGMs can then be accomplished either through approximate 
optimization-based techniques (e.g., Variational Bayes) or stochastic tech-
niques (Monte Carlo). Eventually, notice that, in the last decade, the num-
ber of public repositories has grown larger, where behavioural data gathered 
in realistic, natural setting experiments have been recorded by multiple mo-
dalities (Calvo, D’Mello 2010). Such data can be readily employed for 
model learning and validation.
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Figure 2. Top: the dynamic PGM of an active sensing loop. Centre: structural/
functional constraints implied by circuits for visual processing and executive 
control. Bottom: the perception-emotion-action PGM.
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Caveats on methodology
Though minimal, would the implemented version of the model meet 
the requirement of making decisions by virtue of “having emotions”? Such 
question entails a number of hindrances.
First, we have assumed, based on Damasio’s distinction between emo-
tions and feelings, to rule out the latter. Under such disentanglement, 
emotions are likely to be amenable to third person description (and thus 
modelled), whilst feelings would necessarily involve first person experience 
(opening to the conundrum of consciousness) (Trautteur 2016).
Second, we have set up a computational theory (Marr 1982) in the 
Bayesian framework of Probabilistic Graphical Models, where the RVs 
capturing essential behavioural properties are shaped in the PGM structure 
by using structural constraints suggested at the neurobiological level. Once 
implemented, the model is in principle suitable to simulate attentive be-
haviour conditioned by emotion. How things stand, putting the simulation 
of the model into work2 is nothing but an instance of the synthetic method 
(Cordeschi 2002), i.e. the building of artefacts as explanatory models of 
living organisms. The synthetic method, per se, entails a variety of problems 
(Cordeschi 2008).
In particular, the “underdetermination” problem involves the choice of 
“the right grain of analysis for models”. To handle the computational expla-
nation at different grains/levels (Figure 3), we have adopted a revised form 
of Marr’s framework (Marr 1982). In a Bayesian formalism (Boccignone, 
Cordeschi 2007), Marr’s three-fold hierarchy can be re-organized into 
two levels (Knill et al. 1996): the computational theory level, which can be 
formalized precisely in terms of Bayesian theory, and the implementation 
theory level embedding both algorithmic and realization levels.
2 For a nice discussion of simulation in cognition, see Santucci et al. 2016.
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Figure 3. The synthetic method loop embedding different levels of explanation.
Differently from Marr (Boccignone, Cordeschi 2007), the notion of 
architecture becomes crucial: the PGM embodies constraints assumed by the 
scientist for his own purpose at the chosen level of explanation. The algorith-
mic level does not so far provide an autonomous level, rather one encompass-
ing simulations of different grains (a coarse-grained simulation of Bayesian 
inference at the behavioural level, a fine-grained simulation at the neural 
level, see Figure 3).
As to the realization level, it is current practice to choose some formal 
neuronal model to the end (e.g., integrate-and-fire neurons, stochastic dif-
ferential equations. simple binary, on/off models). This justifies the term 
“implementation theory”: the realization level is but another kind of theo-
retical model (Abbott, Kepler 1990). Yet, further levels of reduction, and 
further theoretical models too, could be achieved (ibidem) going down in 
the hierarchy.
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In summary, the Bayesian approach provides a sound formalization of 
Marr’s functionalist intuition of a computational theory level. However, a 
deceptively simple question arises (Sprevak 2016, p. 92): how should we 
interpret Bayesian models? One option is instrumentalism, where Bayesian 
machinery should be understood as a formal device (ibidem) to describe hu-
man behavioural patterns concisely and to make predictions. The alternative 
is realism: models pick out real entities and processes in the human brain 
(“Bayesian brain hypothesis”; see Knill, Pouget 2004).
The Bayesian approach is advocated for handling uncertainty, stemming 
from lack of knowledge and from randomness. Going down in the explana-
tion hierarchy, basic sources of randomness are classical dynamics unpredict-
ability and quantum processes, which in living systems are likely to take place 
simultaneously and affect each other. Further, different levels of organization 
make things worse: multi-level interactions induce subsequent forms of ran-
domness (Buiatti, Longo 2013). If one assumes a realistic stance, these 
“living matter” effects pose serious challenges to the functionalism captured 
by the computationalist account (Cordeschi, Frixione 2007). Indeed, there 
is severe criticism (Longo 2009) in the ability of digital computation to fully 
reproduce (not just mimicking) this dynamics even in simple cases (deter-
ministic unpredictability).
A viable shortcut (Cordeschi, Frixione 2007) is the “encapsulation” of 
any critical level dealing with a non-Turing computable function in an em-
bedded subsystem, so to consider only the computable outputs that might 
be relevant for higher embedding levels. However, even the “encapsulation” 
practice is not, at least in principle, unquestionable. Since minor changes in 
one level might be amplified by the exchanges with another level, such ap-
proach might rule out underpinning properties at the biological level, crucial 
for the overall behaviour of the system, especially in the case of emotions. 
Even discarding the conundrum of feelings, yet emotions use both neural 
and humoral routes, so that the resulting emotional state involves continuous, 
analogue changes within the body proper, e.g., viscera, internal milieu, etc.
All the above issues let us surmise that there is much work left for scien-
tists. And even more for philosophers.
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The Role of Emotions and Intrinsic Motivations on 
Decision-Making: a Comparison between 
 Natural and Artificial Systems
Valentina Trombetta
Introduction
Decision-making is an important and multifaceted cognitive process. 
Every agent has to be able to evaluate the implications of his/her actions 
to ensure his/her welfare in a given environment. As such, decision-making 
pertains to both human beings and robots, because they live in a specific 
environment that demands choices to achieve specific goals, such as survival.
Figure 1. Basal ganglia structures. Source: Lim et al. 2014.
From a neurological point of view, the main areas of the brain involved in 
this process are the basal ganglia and the amygdalae. Neurological research 
shows that the basal ganglia and cortex are involved in decision-making be-
tween alternative actions (Bogacz, Gurney 2007). The basal ganglia are a 
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large collection of subcortical structures and are part of the extrapyramidal 
motor system, the part of the motor system concerned with automatic move-
ment. In addition to these functions, new data support an expanded role for 
the basal ganglia in cognitive processes (Berns, Sejnowski 1996).
On the other hand, the involvement of the amygdala is important, be-
cause it plays a primary role in emotional processes. Emotions can be con-
sidered a collection of neural and chemical responses, which have a twofold 
function: to produce a specific reaction to the inducing situation and to regu-
late internal states of the organism that produce specific reactions. Emotions 
can also influence the process of choice as judgement is engaged. Another 
psychological aspect that affects choice is intrinsic motivation, as it generally 
guides behaviour.
However, beyond neurobiology, decision-making is a cognitive process 
that involves issues coming from different fields of knowledge, like neuro-
science, psychology and philosophy. In this paper, we focus on the psycho-
logical point of view, because the overlap1 with robotics enables us to better 
understand this process through a comparison between natural and artificial 
systems.
Emotions
Emotions have a role in decision-making: they help reasoning, especially 
in personal and social matters. They guide us to choose the best course of ac-
tion and to avoid the worst, in view of our general welfare. A simple example 
is the emotion of fear: if we are on a dark and isolated street, we can avoid 
possible dangers by changing course. Everything depends on our level of fear 
and concern.
The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio describes emotions as follows:
Emotions are a complicated collection of chemical and neural responses, form-
ing a pattern; […] emotions are about the life of an organism, its body to be 
precise, and their role is to assist the organism in maintaining life (Damasio 
1999, p. 51).
1 Several theories and experiments in robotics try to simulate in artificial systems the processes of 
emotions and intrinsic motivations.
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Furthermore, he states that emotions are biologically determined, that 
they are produced in the subcortical regions and that they can be engaged au-
tomatically without consciousness, using the body as their theatre. Emotions 
take place when the body perceives new objects or events through its sensory 
devices, as well as when certain objects or events are recalled from memory. 
Different emotions are induced by different brain systems and the specific 
brain sites of interest are the following: brain-stem region, hypothalamus, 
basal forebrain, amygdala, sectors of the anterior cingulate region and parts of 
the ventromedial prefrontal region. For Damasio, there is a mutual and con-
tinuous relationship between the body and brain’s states inducing emotions, 
which he calls “as if body loop”. The first step of this loop is the engagement 
of the organism by an inducer of emotion. For example, a specific object vi-
sually processed or, in other words, a visual representation of that object. In 
the second step, the signals of the elaboration of the object’s image activate 
all neural sites that are prepared to respond to the particular class of inducer 
to which the object belongs. Finally, in the third step, emotion induction 
sites send a number of signals towards other brain sites and towards the body. 
The combination of these three steps causes a momentary and appropriate 
emotion.
Damasio’s work shows that emotion is integral to the processes of reason-
ing and decision-making, for better or for worse. An example of impairment 
caused by the absence of an emotion is one of his patients, suffering from Ur-
bach-Wiethe disease2, which brings about a total calcification of both amyg-
dalae. While the patient maintains normal cognitive and social skills, her 
inability to recognize suspicious faces or situations makes her incapable of 
fear, and thus of avoiding social risks. This shows how an emotion can affect 
an action’s selection and how emotions are important for survival.
There are many theories that devise strategies for computing the process 
of emotions3. One is in the Component Process Model by Klaus R. Scherer. In 
Scherer 2009, he claims:
Emotion will be considered here as a bounded episode in the life of a system 
that is characterized as an emergent pattern of component synchronization, 
2 A rare autosomal recessive condition characterized by abnormal depositions of calcium in the 
skin and throat (Damasio 1999).
3 For example, theoretical and practical developments about Affective Computing and Social Ro-
bots.
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preparing adaptive action tendencies to relevant events, as defined by their 
behavioural meaning and aiming at establishing control precedence over be-
haviour (Scherer 2009, p. 3459).
When there is a relevant event, the system evaluates it and its outcomes 
through a set of criteria, called SEC (stimulus evaluation checks)4. The result 
of this assessment is a motivational effect that changes the motivational 
state before the occurrence of the event. This new motivational effect brings 
changes in the automatic nervous system, in particular somatovisceral effects, 
and in the somatic nervous system, through motor expressions in face, voice 
and body. Furthermore, to compute procedures of synchronization non-lin-
ear dynamic systems techniques are required, which might be drawn from 
self-organization theory or chaos theory.
Both Damasio and Scherer point to the connection between the internal 
systems of an organism, his body and the environment to produce emotions. 
Relevant events in the world are appraised from specific brain sites, and then 
changes occur in different subsystems of the organism to represent, cogni-
tively and physically, a particular emotion. On the basis of the emotion that 
is produced there will be a different action’s selection between the available 
options:
It is also important to note that while the biological machinery for emotions 
is largely present, the inducers are not part of the machinery, they are external 
to it. […] Emotion and the biological machinery underlying it are the obligate 
accompaniment of behaviour, conscious or not (Damasio 1999, pp. 57-58).
Intrinsic motivations
The other psychological aspect that can affect decision-making is mo-
tivation. Motivations, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, have three important 
functions: to guide behaviours in order to satisfy the most important needs, 
to establish the amount of energy required to perform action selection and to 
generate learning signals5.
Extrinsic motivations are mechanisms, which guide the learning of 
skills and knowledge on the basis of homeostatic needs detected within the 
4 They are four: relevance, implications, coping potential and normative significance.
5 Learning signals guide learning mechanisms to acquire behaviours that increase fitness.
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visceral body. The learning signals produced by extrinsic motivations tend 
to disappear when the homeostatic needs are satisfied but resurface when 
the needs return. They are common in different species. Examples could 
include physiological needs, like hunger, thirst, sleep and so on.
Intrinsic motivations are mechanisms, which guide the learning of skills 
and knowledge on the basis of the levels and the variations of these skills 
and knowledge detected within the brain. The learning signals produced by 
intrinsic motivations tend to decrease when the skills and the knowledge 
that they induced are acquired. They emerged later than extrinsic motiva-
tions during evolution. An example is the curiosity that drives the desire to 
gain new knowledge, which is very important for cumulative learning, that 
is, the ability to acquire skills and knowledge that improve over time, to be 
exploited in new situations and environments.
For our purpose, intrinsic motivations are more relevant. We can divide 
them into knowledge-based and competence-based (Baldassarre 2011). The 
first one is based on what the system (natural or artificial) knows, meaning 
the capacity of the system to change its environment, its body as well as 
its interaction between body and environment. The second one is based on 
what the system can do. In other words, the capability of the system to have 
specific effects on the environment. It is important to have both of them to 
perform adaptive cumulative learning.
Generally, the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations allow an intelligent 
system to survive in its environment and this principle is valid also for ar-
tificial systems, through the use of reward in the learning’s algorithm. Two 
cases will be illustrated below: the robot arm Katana by Hung Ngo (2012) 
and Curious Robot by Dario Di Nocera et al. (2014).
Ngo’s experiment has been performed on both the simulated and the real 
robot arm Katana and uses only an intrinsic reward to guide the behaviour 
of the system. The setting is a blocks-world formed by eight different blocks 
with different colours and different heights. There is a camera to see and 
recognize the different blocks and when there are concealed blocks, their 
features and dispositions are stored in a memory module. It is implemented 
with an online learning algorithm and the intrinsic reward is artificial curi-
osity. The task of this experiment is divided into two steps: the first one is to 
choose a placement location, and the second is to choose which is the right 
block to put in that specific location. Furthermore, after the execution of the 
second step there is a query condition, which must indicate when an outcome 
is statistically known or unknown. This is important for a sequential decision 
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process because it is based on the expected learning progress. The behaviour 
of the system works in an exploration-exploitation trade-off: it exploits the 
acquired knowledge to make the best choice and explores the predicted ac-
tions to improve its representation of the setting’s model. The result is that 
the Progress-driven artificial curiosity is a more general method for balancing 
exploration and exploitation (Ngo 2012).
Figure 2. The Katana robot arm. Source: Ngo 2012.
The second experiment is Curious Robot (CR), so called by his author 
Di Nocera. In this case, extrinsic motivations as well as intrinsic motiva-
tions are simulated. There are three differently coloured blocks with corre-
sponding functions: green blocks for the function EAT, blue blocks for the 
function DRINK, black blocks for the function AVOID. A threshold indi-
cates a wellness state of the system. When the latter is under the threshold, 
the system needs to eat and drink. When the wellness state is over the 
threshold, it can explore its environment. The task of this experiment is to 
survive in this setting, with obstacles, for a given time. It is implemented 
with Q-learning6 and the intrinsic reward is curiosity. There are two com-
ponents to implement curiosity. The first one is the Wanting, the residual 
value of Energy for the robot body, this means that curiosity can only oc-
6 Q-learning is a reinforcement algorithm to find an optimal action-selection policy.
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cur if the wellness state is not critical and the robot can spend energy on 
behaviours not associated with primary needs. The second component is 
the Liking, the pleasure due to novel situations that is the level of Novelty 
in the exploration of the learning states. Finally, Di Nocera et al. (2014) 
compare CR with the behaviour of another robot: Not-Curious Robot (N-
CR), so called because it does not have artificial curiosity. The result is that 
CR has safer behaviour than N-CR, as it eats and drinks more frequently 
and not only when the wellness state is under the threshold. Moreover, it 
has more time to explore, knows its environment and is more able to avoid 
the objects and walls to survive.
Figure 3. Experimental results for Curious (A-red line) or Non-Curious 
(B-blue line) Robots. These diagrams show the space of the environment 
explored. Source: Di Nocera et al. 2014.
These experiments show that motivations are important in an intelligent 
being’s life, whether natural or artificial.
Conclusions
From a philosophical point of view, all these aspects can be discussed in 
a specific theoretical framework. In particular, in an enactive and dynamic 
approach. Thre term “Enactivism” was introduced in 1991 by Francisco J. Va-
rela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in their book The Embodied Mind. 
In this approach, the cognitive agents are conceived as autonomous systems: 
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that is, self-organizing systems that generate and maintain themselves and 
enact7 their cognitive domains. Furthermore, cognition is described like the 
exercise of skillful know-how in situated and embodied action.
The central idea of “Dynamicism” is that cognitive agents are dynamic 
systems and action, perception and cognition should be explained in dynamic 
terms, that is, as continuous coevolution8. This approach includes dynam-
ic systems modelling (mathematical modelling of empirical systems), and 
experimental investigations of biological and psychological phenomena in-
formed by these tools (Thompson 2007).
The fundamental point is that Enactivism and Dynamicism share an 
important idea: the relationship between brain, body and environment as 
the basic structure for the emergence of cognition. As we have seen, deci-
sion-making is a cognitive process affected by emotions and intrinsic mo-
tivations and both of them are possible only for agents in an environment. 
Indeed, emotions involve a biological aspect, brain and body, as well as an 
external aspect, because the stimuli that cause emotions are in the perceptual 
world of the agent. It is the same for intrinsic motivations, which include 
brain and body, but also an exchange of input and output with the outside 
that allows the agent to act.
The final question is: is it possible for artificial agents to simulate a com-
plete decision-making? A complete decision-making requires an agent who 
chooses an action not optimal but the best for his survival, and not using only 
reason but also emotions and motivations. As we have seen earlier, artificial 
systems are able to simulate emotions and intrinsic motivations as elements 
steering their future behaviour. The basic principle about the deep connec-
tion between brain, body and environment seems to be respected in human 
beings as well as in robots. The fundamental difference is the way in which 
behaviour is expressed: robots do not have a biological body and brain, but 
specific algorithms can reproduce some particular processes. Robots have a 
different structure, which tends to simulate the living processes of natural 
systems. Until now, in the state-of-art robotics there are several models, each 
of which simulates a particular cognitive process (memory, emotion, and so 
7 Enaction means the action of enacting a law, but it also connotes more generally the performance 
or carrying out of an action (Thompson 2007).
8 Cognition is seen as the flow of complex temporal structures mutually and simultaneously in-
fluencing each other (Thompson 2007).
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on). This means that there is a lack of complexity such as it is required for 
a complete decision-making. Not only emotions or motivations, but both 
of them and other elements are necessary together. So, we should wait for 
the future developments in robotics to see if it is really possible to develop a 
complete decision-making in artificial systems.
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The Synthetic Approach and 
the Evolution of Cognition
Francesco Bianchini
Introduction: biology and cognition
The birth of artificial intelligence (AI) and the concurrent start of the 
logic/symbolic tradition in intelligent artificial systems in the 1950s and the 
1960s led to the neglect of evolutionary issues as relevant for the study of 
cognition. This trend has been reversed in the last thirty years with the new 
AI and new cognitive science, that is, a cognitive science characterized by the 
4E – embodied, embedded, enactive, extended – approach, within the gener-
al framework of embodied cognition and sensory-motor and environmental 
explanation of cognitive capabilities.
Such a new trend of cognitive science and AI, at least the AI devoted 
to the explanation of intelligent behaviour, is certainly more connected to 
biology than the earlier one. Neural networks and connectionism – brain 
inspired approaches –, artificial life, biologically inspired cognitive architec-
tures, swarm cognition and situated robotics, embodied cognition and the 
sensory-motor explanation of cognitive capabilities are examples. However, 
even though one may think that biological heuristics in AI are akin to an 
evolutionary explanation of cognition, the equation is not so simple, a point 
which is usually not emphasized. Not all of biology is evolutionary, and the 
biological inspiration in AI and cognitive science needs therefore to be more 
precisely defined.
AI, biology and evolution
The relationship between biology and AI is old, older than AI itself. 
Cybernetics, one of the discipline that concurred to AI birth (Cordeschi 
2002), deals with the problem of “Control and Communication in the Ani-
mal and the Machine” (Wiener 1948). In the 1940s and 1950s, the mecha-
nistic explanation of the teleological behaviour typical of biological systems 
fostered a new approach to the study of the mind within a computational 
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framework and of computer simulations of purpose-oriented autonomous 
behaviour. Moreover, the work of Turing on embryology and morphogen-
esis – the “biological” Turing (1948) – as well as the work of von Neumann 
on self-reproductive systems and self-replicating automata (von Neumann 
1951) exploited biological ideas to build computer simulations of artificial 
autonomous systems, thus laying the foundations of artificial life. Both math-
ematicians worked before the officially recognized birth of AI in 1956, pro-
viding the basis for its conceptual framework.
While all these works are usually considered seminal for artificial life, it 
is only von Neumann’s research that is strictly related to evolution. Actually, 
the main goal of these early research programs on self-regulating machines 
and self-replicating systems shared, notwithstanding the differences between 
Wiener, Turing and von Neumann, was the aim to explain and reproduce the 
self-organization at the basis of living systems.
On the other hand, self-organization is also the focus of artificial life 
since the 1980s, that is the study of the properties of life in general, at a 
more abstract level than other more “biological” disciplines, or, in the words 
of the founder of this field, life as it could be rather than life as we know 
it (Langton 1989). Computer simulation and modelling methodologies of 
artificial life are focused on reproducing the spontaneous emergence of or-
der, starting from simple properties and the intrinsic structure of the system, 
independently of its interaction with the environment and without the inter-
vention of a designer or a programmer (Boden 2006).
Artificial life, therefore, has to do with emergence and self-organization, 
but, differently from other approaches such as biomimetics or synthetic biol-
ogy, is more interested in an abstract notion of life phenomena and biological 
aspects than in the building or reproduction of particular parts of a living 
creature. In this case yet, the use of evolutionary principles is just partial and 
limited.
The only work addressing entirely the principles and the mechanisms of 
evolution in the early AI and cognitive science period is that of von Neumann 
on self-replicating machines1 or, in his own term, automata. Von Neumann’s 
main aim was to catch the properties of self-reproducing and self-replicating 
systems (which are, actually, not the same thing). In the outline sketched in 
the Hixon Symposium of 1948 von Neumann speaks of a physical system 
capable of self-reproducing itself and equates the possible copy errors, with 
1 On this topic, see Bianchini 2016.
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their heritability, to mutations in genetic evolution. It was only with the logi-
cal approach to these systems, thanks to the contribution of Stanislaw Ulam2, 
however, that von Neumann was capable to give the foundations of tessella-
tion structures or, as they have been called later, cellular automata.
Cellular automata are the main pathway by which evolution comes into 
the more recent field of AI and cognitive science. They are at the basis of the 
Game of Life by John Conway, which became soon part of the new artificial 
life field, bringing into it the logical mechanisms of evolutionary theory, as 
a cellular automaton is capable to self-replicate3. Another research program 
stemming from von Neumann’s work on tessellations is the one by John Hol-
land, which extended the cellular automata theory towards an even more 
evolutionary course. In fact, in Holland’s works, “mutation” is not just a possi-
bility. On the contrary, it is an integral part of the methodology he developed. 
His method is based on the idea that programs could be symbolized in the 
binary code, as in a Universal Turing Machine or a computer at the level 
of machine language, and they may be split and combined, with a certain 
amount of noise or copy errors, to generate new programs. Over the gener-
ations, the best programs, i.e. programs with the best performance in accor-
dance with the expected results, are selected to generate new programs more 
and more adapted to the task to be accomplished. Adaptation and selection 
are notions Holland has taken especially from evolutionary theory. Holland’s 
main contribution to AI and cognitive science in the mid-1970s (Holland 
1975) is a general theory of “genetic algorithms” and a logical theory of adap-
tive systems and represents the official entry of evolution in such disciplines.
Genetic algorithms, even though they are not the first application of 
evolutionary principles to programming techniques, made the evolutionary 
approach very popular, and also feasible thanks to the increase of computer 
and processor power. Besides, they did contribute to the development of evo-
lutionary computation, an AI subfield inspired by biological evolution and 
characterized by algorithms for global optimizations strategies, especially for 
problem solving4. Evolutionary computation has developed lately into a new 
subfield, evolutionary robotics5, which simulates different generations of ro-
2 See Bialynicki-Birula, Bialynicka-Birula 2004.
3 In fact, not every cellular automaton has the lifelike property of self-replication.
4 See, for example, De Jong 2006.
5 Nolfi, Floreano 2000.
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bots by evolving their control software and transferring it to the next gener-
ation of physical robots. This is also a way to reproduce the open-endedness 
of evolution in the physical world.
In her detailed history of AI and cognitive science Boden (2006) lists a 
series of fields that link together evolution, on one hand, and AI and cogni-
tion, on the other. In addition to the theories of the forerunners of AI (Wie-
ner, Turing, von Neumann), she deals, of course, with evolutionary program-
ming, genetic algorithms and evolutionary robotics. She mentions, however, 
also evolutionary psychology and evolutionary semantics, which both explain 
cognitive capabilities and mental contents by natural selection and evolution-
ary history. But in the case of these latter disciplines the major claim is rather 
that something is the result of evolution, which is quite different from ex-
ploiting the principles of evolutionary theory to explain and simulate cogni-
tive capabilities and intelligent behaviour by “building” artificial autonomous 
systems. What is at stake here is rather to employ the power of evolution to 
carry out processes of transition from chaos to order, and the emergence of 
cognition, in a bottom up manner.
Evolution, the synthetic approach and a conclusion
Transition from chaos to order, that is from unorganized to organized 
systems, is typical of different AI approaches6. Neural networks and the con-
nectionist approach (Rumelhart et al. 1986), especially in distributed and 
subsymbolic systems, are one of the main examples, but there are also other 
approaches: the subcognitive models (Hofstadter et al. 1995)7, the swarm 
cognition approach (Trianni et al. 2011), among others. Even though all 
these approaches can be considered biologically inspired and aim at mod-
elling adaptive systems, not all of them involve evolution and evolutionary 
methods.
It has been recently suggested that the synthetic method, or the method 
of model building, is a method shared both by old and new AI and cogni-
tive science (Cordeschi 2008). The synthetic method has been historically 
6 For a very early discussion on this topic with reference to intelligent systems, see Turing 1948.
7 In these models, evolutionary methods are just a part of the heuristics used to exploit the transi-
tion from randomness to a deterministic view (the solution) in a process of problem solving. Other 
bio-inspired heuristics are drawn from cellular metabolism and immune system; see Mitchell 
2006.
95
The Synthetic Approach and the Evolution of Cognition 
defined as the search for the fundamental principles that allow an organ-
ism to learn and the engineering of mechanical artifacts according to these 
theoretical principles (Craik 1966). To this aim, the major issue is to build 
into the model, that is synthetize, the right constraints, i.e. those relevant for 
explaining a cognitive theory. In a unified view of AI and cognition studies, 
therefore, «what distinguishes old and new cognitive science is the choice 
of the level of explanation at which the right constraints for the models are 
to be introduced» (Cordeschi 2008, p. 245). Within the framework of the 
synthetic approach, cognition is a matter of constraints, because the simula-
tive aspect requires model building, and models require the right i.e. relevant 
constraints to be considered the appropriate models for testing the explica-
tive power of a cognitive theory. Without the right constraints, we have just 
imitation or mimicking without explicative power.
This is a very crucial epistemological problem for every science of the ar-
tificial committed to the explanation of a special phenomenon, even though 
many disciplines do not consider it so crucial. For example, synthetic biol-
ogy is not committed to the explanation of life phenomena, but with the 
artificial construction or re-design of biological parts and systems for useful 
purposes (Freemont, Kitney 2012). Thus, it neglects the possible explana-
tory potential of biological synthesis to understanding life. Specific theories 
about living beings could provide new methods and purposes in designing 
and building synthetic biological parts. I do not want to claim that synthetic 
biology is an a-theoretical discipline. I just want to suggest that it misses 
the epistemological questions which arise from «the conspicuous difference 
between the production of artificial life and the artificial production of life» 
(Keller 2002, p. 19). With regard to AI and cognitive science, this may be 
tantamount to claim that there is a difference between the production of 
artificial cognition and the artificial production of cognition. This ambiguity 
is mirrored in the traditional split between the psychological AI and the 
engineering AI. While the former is more concerned with the explanation of 
cognitive phenomena, the latter is more concerned with the results achieved 
by employing useful techniques.
I think the same ambiguity appears with regard to evolution. Evolution-
ary methods exploit the power of selection and focus on adaptiveness with 
reference to a specific context (not necessarily a physical environment). Thus, 
the constraints in models using evolutionary methods are related to the in-
teraction with that context. From a synthetic point of view, the transition 
from chaos to order, or from randomness to stability in response to a specif-
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ic environment, which characterizes the evolutionary approaches in AI and 
cognition, is not easily traced back to a set of theoretical constraints that 
explain directly a cognitive capability. On one hand evolutionary method and 
techniques in AI appear to be more intended to achieving a system able to 
perform a class of specific tasks than committed to a clear explanatory goal; 
on the other, evolutionary methods allow to build systems capable to interact 
increasingly better with the real world – especially in evolutionary robotics – 
and that are not just models of something cognitive or autonomous or intelli-
gent, but that are on their own, at the end of evolutionary process, something 
cognitive or autonomous or intelligent.
Evolutionary techniques are a large part of the more recent research in 
AI and cognition as well as in other synthetic discipline such as synthetic 
biology. New trends show a concurrence of interests in these discipline8. Evo-
lution and evolutionary methods are, however, just a part of the new biolog-
ically-inspired approaches to AI and cognition, but with their peculiarities 
they allow to draw closer different disciplines with a confluence of interest 
in the biological world and, at the same time, to catch the power of life to 
attain cognition in the very way life produced cognition. Nevertheless, their 
explanatory power about cognition is the same one we could expect from the 
biological evolution in explaining cognition.
References
Bialynicki-Birula I., Bialynicka-Birula I. 2004, Modeling Reality: How Comput-
ers Mirror Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bianchini F. 2016, Artificial Intelligence and Synthetic Biology: A Tri-temporal Contri-
bution, in «BioSystems», 148, pp. 32-39.
Boden M. 2006, Mind as Machine. A History of Cognitive Science, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
Copeland J. 2004, The Essential Turing, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Cordeschi R. 2002, The Discovery of the Artificial: Behaviour, Mind and Machines 
Before and Beyond Cybernetics, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Cordeschi R. 2008, Steps Toward the Synthetic Method: Symbolic Information Process-
ing and Self-Organizing Systems in Early Artificial Intelligence Modeling, in The Me-
8 See Zwart et al. 2016.
97
The Synthetic Approach and the Evolution of Cognition 
chanical Mind in History, ed. by P. Husband, O. Holland, M. Wheeler, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, pp. 219-258.
Craik K.J.W. 1962, The Mechanism of Human Action, in The Nature of Psychology, ed. 
by S.L. Sherwood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
De Jong K.A. 2006, Evolutionary Computation: A Unified Approach, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge MA.
Freemont P., Kitney R. 2012, Synthetic Biology: A Primer, Imperial College Press, 
London.
Hofstadter D.R., FARG 1995, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer 
Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought, Basic Books, New York.
Holland J.H. 1975, Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge MA.
Keller E. Fox 2002, Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with 
Models, Metaphors, and Machines, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
Langton C.G. 1989, Artificial Life, in Artificial Life, Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary 
Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, Sept. 1987, ed. by C.G. 
Langton, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, pp. 1-47.
Mitchell M. 2006, Complex Systems: Network Thinking, in «Artificial Intelligence», 
170(18), pp. 1194-1212.
Nolfi S., Floreano D. 2000, Evolutionary Robotics: The Biology, Intelligence, and 
Technology of Self-Organizing Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Rumelhart D.E., McClelland J.L., PDP Research Group 1986, Parallel Dis-
tributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge MA.
Trianni V., Tuci E., Passino K.M., Marshall J.A.R 2011, Swarm Cognition: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of Self-organizing Biological Collectives, in 
«Swarm Intelligence», 5, pp. 3-18.
Turing, A.M. 1948, Intelligent Machinery. Internal report of National Physics Labo-
ratory, (reprinted in Copeland 2004, pp. 410–432).
Turing A.M. 1952, The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis, in «Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society B», 237, pp. 37-72.
Von Neumann J. 1951, The General and Logical Theory of Automata, in Cerebral Mech-
anisms in Behaviour: The Hixon Symposium, ed. by L.A. Jeffress, Chapman & Hall, 
London; J. Wiley, New York, pp. 1-13.
Wiener N. 1948, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Zwart H., Landeweerd L., Lemmens P. 2016, Continental Philosophical Perspectives 
on Life Sciences and Emerging Technologies, in «Life Sciences, Society and Policy», 12:8.
98
 
III
Bodily Boundaries and Beyond:  
Machines Extend  
the Bodies and their World?
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The Organism, Maker of Machines
Fiorenza Lupi
Machine and Organism is the second of three lectures held by Georges 
Canguilhem at the Collège philosophique in 1946-1947 and then collected in 
The Knowledge of Life in 1952. It opens with the remark that «The problem 
of the relations between machine and organism has generally been studied 
only in one direction» (Canguilhem 2008, p. 76): in this analogy, the living 
organism has always been assimilated to the machine, considering the latter 
«a simple application of a knowledge conscious of its import and certain of 
its effects» (ibidem). Rather, suggests Canguilhem, it is the construction of 
a technical object that should be understood starting from the functioning 
of organisms.
Canguilhem’s “U-turn”, far from attributing anthropomorphic charac-
teristics to technical objects, aims to shield the organism from biological 
determinism, which considers it a fully decipherable machine. Thus, the 
author’s operation is not a simple reversal of the relationship, but rather a 
rethinking that focuses on the specificity of the human being and of the 
qualities and performances of its sensitivity.
In support of this interpretation, I will consider the text of Machine and 
organism in the framework of other two of Georges Canguilhem’s philo-
sophical works on technique: Descartes et la technique (1937) and The Role of 
Analogies and Models in Biological Discovery (1963).
The technological problem. Life, science and technique
Canguilhem observes that it is not possible to address the biological prob-
lem of the organism-machine without approaching the technological problem 
that is the relationship between technique and science. What comes first, sci-
ence or technique? He recognizes in the technique the expression of human 
creativity. In his early writings (1926-1939), he had already defined the tech-
nical act as a daily form of creation. In Activité technique et creation, he wrote 
that «the technique is the unreflective1 experience unconsciously directed 
1 Here “irréfléchie”, has been literally translated but it means: spontaneous, meaning an experience 
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towards creation» (Canguilhem 2011a, p. 502, my translation). Far from 
devaluing the technical invention, this description clarifies its relationship 
with science: the construction of an instrument is not the mere application of 
fundamental principles, but manual and practical ingenuity.
Canguilhem criticized the transfer of the Cartesian theory of knowledge 
into the conception of technical action. In the first lines of Descartes et la 
technique, he wrote: «Is the technical activity a simple extension of objective 
knowledge – as it has become common to assume after the positivist phi-
losophy, or is it the expression of an original “power”, creative after all, and 
for which science sometimes and only afterwards draws up a research pro-
gramme or a precautionary code?» (Canguilhem 2011b, p. 490, my transla-
tion). Descartes despises art without explanation, inventors without method, 
and he very much distrusts craftsmen. Howewer, as Canguilhem remarks, 
in La Dioptrique (1637) Descartes shows awareness of a form of relation-
ship between knowledge and technical construction other than that which 
derives the latter from the former. The starting point of theoretical optics 
was in fact the invention of the telescope, due to experience and luck. In the 
transition from theory to practice the possible knowledge (even an ideally 
perfect knowledge) cannot eliminate all imperfections from technical reali-
zation. «Each technical synthesis should include the unpredictable and the 
unexpected, by operating on parts of the organisms whose deduction may not 
be integral» (Canguilhem 2011b, p. 496, my translation): the technique here 
is the model for that creative activity, which can also be found in art and life. 
Not only does the technical practice precede the scientific discovery, but it is 
also its necessary condition: the theory, in fact, follows, as an interrogation on 
the failures and mistakes (creative themselves as knowledge opportunities) of 
the technical act.
In Machine and organism, Canguilhem insists on the need for a technical 
mediation at the foundation of the scientific knowledge, by mentioning §43 
of the Critique of Judgment, where Kant defines the peculiarity of human 
technique:
What one can do the moment one only knows what is to be done, hence with-
out anything more than sufficient knowledge of the desired result, is not called 
not subject to rational activity.
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art2. To art that alone belongs for which the possession of the most complete 
knowledge does not involve one’s having then and there the skill to do it. 
Camper describes very exactly how the best shoe must be made, but he, doubt-
less, was not able to turn one out himself (Kant 2007, p. 133).
But if this is true, the statement that the machine is «a simple appli-
cation of a knowledge conscious of its import and certain of its effects» 
(Canguilhem 2008, p. 76) falls apart. Ingenuity, Canguilhem says, is as 
inexplicable in its formative process as life. To make use of a machine to ex-
plain a biological function is not really to apply a knowledge, and therefore 
does not entail any certainty about its effects. We may define a technical 
object «as an artificial construct, a work of human being, whose essential 
function depends on mechanisms» (ibidem).
Canguilhem’s second step is to address the relationship between mech-
anism and finalism: «The mechanical explanation of the functions of life 
historically presupposes [...] the construction of automatons, whose name 
signifies at once the miraculous character and the apparent self-sufficien-
cy of a mechanism transforming an energy that is not [...] the effect of a 
human or animal muscular effort» (ibidem, p. 78). However, according to 
Canguilhem there is no real opposition between mechanism and finalism: 
in fact, although the functioning of the automaton cannot be reduced to 
relations of pure causality, its construction would be impossible without 
a purpose, or without a human being: «A machine cannot replace another 
machine. The more limited the purpose, the more the margin of tolerance is 
reduced, and the more hardened and pronounced the purpose appears to be. 
In the organism, by contrast, one observes […] a vicariousness of functions, 
a polyvalence of organs» (ibidem, p. 89). Because there is no such thing as a 
machine able to build other machines, explaining organisms through me-
chanical models is a tautology, just like explaining an organ using an organ3.
In The normal and the pathological, the author emphasizes the fact that 
in the case of the living being we cannot talk about normality as conformity 
to pre-established rules, but we need to introduce the concept of norma-
tivity as ability to create new norms replacing the existing ones. “Normal” 
2 The German word used by Kant is Kunst, which describes any human work, not only the art. We 
can translate art with τέχνη in general.
3 It is interesting to note the etymology of the word “organ”: from the Latin organum which means 
tool [Lat. ŏrgănum, Gr. ὄργανον (closer to ἔργον «work»)].
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changes in relation with individual conditions. A good example is that of 
individuals with only one kidney: organisms that have been able to break 
the “rule of two kidneys”, tolerating (the tolerance: what is missing in the 
machines) the loss of one of them and inventing the norm that has allowed 
them to keep living with just one kidney. «Life tolerates monstrosities», 
whereas «there is no machine monster. There is no mechanical pathology» 
(ibidem, p. 90).
The biological problem. Machines, the living being’s organs
In organisms, therefore, phenomena of self-construction, self-regula-
tion, self-preservation and self-repair occur, while all functions of technical 
objects need human intervention in order to be carried out. However, the 
living being “needs” the machines too, just in the same way as he needs his 
organs. In Machine and Organism, Canguilhem refers to Milieu et techniques 
by André Leroi-Gourhan, stating that «the last chapters of this work con-
stitute what is today the most striking example of a systematic and duly 
detailed attempt to bring biology and technology together» (ibidem, p. 95). 
Canguilhem, like Leroi-Gourhan, believes that machines can be considered 
organs of the human species. Consequently, it is human sensitivity which 
plays the main role, as it is characterised, since the very beginning, by the 
ability to extend itself through prostheseis. Like the amoeba, which push-
es out of its mass an extension that captures external objects, so human 
aisthesis externalizes itself in technical tools. In both cases the contact by 
touch is central, «but while the expansion of amoeba always pulls its prey 
toward the same digestive process, between the matter to be dealt with and 
the technical thought that envelops it are created, in each circumstance, 
specific organs of percussion» (ibidem, p. 94). The technique was thus born 
as a «need for the living being» rather than as an application of knowledge:
The rationalization of techniques makes one forget the irrational origin of ma-
chines. And it seems that in this area, as in any other, one must know how to 
cede a place to the irrational, even and especially when one wants to defend 
rationalism (ibidem, p. 95).
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The role of analogy: a normative act
Canguilhem interprets the prevalence in biology of analogical on mathe-
matical models as an evidence that biological entities resist analysis: they are 
phenomena whose complexity cannot be broken down. The analogical meth-
od reduces the organic forms to more familiar mechanisms, borrowing these 
models from technological experience. What should an analogical model do? 
Replicate, not only the effects of the organic function, but also the means of 
its action (the construction of a pattern). A successful model is, for Canguil-
hem, Vaucanson’s flute-player, mentioned by Condorcet:
The Academy of Science was charged with examining the automaton, and de-
cided that mechanism used to give forth the sounds of the flute rigorously 
executed the same operations as someone playing a flute, and that the mechan-
ic had imitated at once the effects and the methods of nature (Canguilhem 
1963, p. 511).
Condorcet had remarked that «the genius of mechanics consists princi-
pally in imagining and disposing in space different mechanisms which must 
produce a given effect and which serve to regulate, distribute, and direct the 
motive power» whereas «an artist owes his talents or success to practice» 
(ibidem). For Condorcet, thanks to the design of schemes, it is possible to in-
vent a mechanical masterpiece “in theory”; in the same way as one calculates 
the movements of a star that one has never seen. Condorcet emancipated 
technique from execution, while for Canguilhem the opposite is true: the 
technical invention does not consist in the application of laws, but in a prac-
tice that leads to the discovery and creation of rules. As we have seen, this 
consideration also means that
By considering technique to be a universal biological phenomenon and no lon-
ger only an intellectual operation of a human being, one is led [...] to affirm the 
creative autonomy4 of arts and crafts from any knowledge capable of appropri-
ating them so as to apply itself to them or informing them so as to multiply 
their effects (Canguilhem 2008, p. 96).
4 From the Greek αὐτονομία “independence”, noun of quality from αὐτόνομος “independent, li-
ving by one’s own laws”, (from gr. αὐτός “self ” and νόμος “law”). In The normal and the pathological it 
is the ability of the organism to invent his/her own rules of life and build his/her own environment.
106
Fiorenza Lupi
In order to explain the functioning of the analogical model, Canguilhem 
gives the example of a nerve as a fluid current conductor. In the analogy be-
tween electricity conduction and blood circulation, the action of the flow is 
only supposed, not perceived. We need the model when there is no possibility 
of analytical breakdown. It replaces the representation and makes it possible 
to consider the blood flow as if5 it were an electrical flow. A good model must 
not assume the identity between two objects; there is no «isomorphism of the 
theories», because the rules of the organism and those of its mechanical mod-
el remain valid and verifiable each in its own area. Many parts of the body can 
be considered as if they were machines, but the organism is not a machine. 
Canguilhem quotes Adrian’s remark: «What we can learn from the machines 
is how our brain must differ from them» (Canguilhem 1963, p. 516).
What is the error in which one may incur by using the analogy between 
machines and organisms? By saying “The organism is a machine” one projects 
on the living being the aspect of predictability, which seems to characterise 
the mechanical action. On the other hand, by saying, “The machine is an 
organism”, one thinks of the machine as a completely autonomous form of 
life. For Canguilhem, even cybernetics is not safe from this danger. Whilst 
recognizing that some machines are capable of self-organization – as in 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow’s study on the anti-aircraft fire control 
system, interpreted as an example of a machine able to change its behaviour, 
by simulating the flexibility of the living being –, Canguilhem believes that 
we cannot underestimate the role of the “as if ” in the analogy. If for Rosen-
blueth, Wiener and Bigelow there is identity between machine and organism 
in regard to the behaviour, for Canguilhem
it is worth noting that recent apologists for the heuristic efficiency in biology 
– especially in neurology – of cybernetic mechanisms and of feedback models, 
consider the construction of classical automata (that is to say those lacking 
some sort of feedback mechanism) capable of simulating, within the limits of 
one or more rigid programmes, animal behaviour or human gestures, to be just 
a craze, without any scientific interest; merely a pastime (ibidem, p. 510).
Moreover, he writes, quoting von Neumann:
5 Note the proximity to the “als ob” of Kantian philosophy. On this interesting similar-
ity, see CavaZZini 2007.
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the structure of natural machines (organisms) is such that failures of function 
do not affect general behaviour. Regenerative functions, or, failing this, the sup-
plementing of the insufficiency of one organ by another, compensate for the 
destruction or the breakdown of certain elements. A lesion of the organism 
does not necessarily abolish its plasticity. The same cannot be said of machines 
(ibidem, p. 516).
Final remarks
The analogy between organisms and machines may be useful if it is con-
ceived as a normative (and so, able to create new rules) act rather than a nor-
malizing act, that is as the desire to control and predict the behaviour of the 
living being. Canguilhem insists on the originality and creativity of the living 
being as opposed to the machines and recommends caution in the use of the 
analogy between machine and organism. However, in all his writings on the 
subject, he reiterates the importance of the technical phenomenon for the 
human being. The relationship between human beings and technical objects, 
the features shared by bodies and machines and «the technological structure 
of human perception» show, once again, «the condition of the human being 
– an organism, but a maker of machines» (ibidem, p. 519).
The relationship between organisms as makers of machines and technical 
objects will be further addressed by Gilbert Simondon, one of Canguilhem’s 
disciples. According to him, machines have a special “mode of existence” and 
are able to evolve... but only if they have a human being by their side.
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The Relation etween Organism, Technique 
and Environment in Gilbert Simondon
Elisa Binda
The philosophy of Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) is increasingly appre-
ciated as a valuable contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate 
about technique. Within the studies in the philosophy of technology, as well 
as in modern media studies, the reference to Simondon’s work is more and 
more frequent. The focus of this renewed attention to his work mostly con-
cerns his theory about the technical objects and the environment to which 
they are associated (Simondon 1958). In fact, Simondon’s observations de-
voted to the configuration of human sensitivity could be misunderstood or 
underestimated if one does not keep in mind the strong connection he es-
tablishes between human sensitivity and technique, which is the focus of the 
present contribution. We believe that the analysis of such an issue is worth of 
attention nowadays, as human sensitivity is increasingly interconnected with 
the use of new technologies and is therefore more externalized and interac-
tive than in the past.
Techno-aesthetics and associated environments
The point of departure for this investigation is a short text that Simondon 
wrote in 1982. It is a letter addressed, but never sent, to Jacques Derrida. In 
this text, Simondon makes a rather radical statement: «The techno-aesthetic 
feeling seems to be a category that is more primitive than the aesthetic feeling 
alone, or than the technical aspect considered from the angle of functionality 
alone (which is an impoverishing perspective)» (Simondon 2012). The state-
ment that the techno-aesthetic feeling is more original than both the pure 
aesthetic feeling and the bare technical aspects underscores that human sen-
sitivity, especially if considered according to its species-specific characters, is 
in principle connected with technical elements, that is, externalized. The kind 
of aesthetics proposed by Simondon, then, cannot be described as a theory 
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concerning solely the “fine arts”, as the reference in the letter to the Greek 
term aisthesis (sensitivity, sensation) highlights. Aesthetics is thus reinstated 
as a reflection with a larger scope, encompassing experience in general, and 
investigates the specific way humans interact with the world through their 
peculiar sensitivity. According to Simondon, this way of interacting with the 
world is eminently technical.
Among Simondon’s essential theoretical references, we must consider the 
paleoethnologist André Leroi-Gourhan, who strongly influenced Simondon’s 
reflection on technique1. This reference helps understanding the statement 
concerning the original character of techno-aesthetics. In fact, Leroi-Gour-
han’s research emphasized the reciprocity of hominization and technogen-
esis. The meaning of human evolution rests for him in the very process of 
externalization: «the whole of our evolution has been oriented toward placing 
outside ourselves what in the rest of the animal world is achieved inside by 
species adaptation» (Leroi-Gourhan 1965, p. 235). It is possible to find 
the specific connotation of human experience and sensitivity in a peculiar 
relation between “inside” and “outside”. According to Bernard Stiegler, whose 
philosophy is strongly connected with Simondon’s reflection,
Hominization is […] a process of exteriorization which, from the point of view 
of paleontology, means that the appearance of the human is the appearance of 
the technical. […]. The movement inherent in this process of exteriorization is 
paradoxical: Leroi-Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhnê, that 
invents the human, not the human who invents the technical. Or again: the 
human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool – by becoming 
exteriorized techno-logically. But here the human is the interior: there is no 
exteriorization that does not point to a movement from interior to exterior. 
Nevertheless, the interior is invented in this movement; it can therefore not 
precede it. Interior and exterior are consequently constituted in a movement 
that invents both one and the other: a moment in which they invent each other 
respectively […]. The interior and the exterior are the same thing, the inside 
is the outside, since man (the interior) is essentially defined by the tool (the 
exterior) (Stiegler 1998, p. 141).
1 This is confirmed by the reference to André Leroi-Gourhan’s works in the bibliography of many 
of Simondon’s texts.
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The relation between “inside” and “outside” is, therefore, co-constitutive 
for the human being. The human processes of externalization have a powerful 
feedback effect, which reconfigures and modifies human beings.
According to Simondon, this movement of endless reconfiguration be-
tween “inside” and “outside” is exactly what constitutes the very process of 
individuation. His main doctoral dissertation, L’individuation à la lumière des 
notions de forme et information, begins with the assertion that the individual 
is the result of an endless process of individuation. According to Simon-
don, the process of individuation moves from a pre-individual natural asset, 
understood as a generating and creative power, close to that of the Pre-So-
cratic physis. The appearance of the individual is however the result of a cou-
pling with the associated environment. By embedding the individual into the 
pre-individual, the former appears as a problematic being, which attempts 
to “solve” itself by individuating, i.e. always configuring individuations anew, 
thanks to the relation to an associated environment. This environment can be 
considered as the field from which the individual derives potentialities.
The relation between the individual and the environment is thus funda-
mentally co-constitutive, since “inside” and “outside” configure each other: 
«the state of a living being consists in a problem to be solved, of which the 
individual itself is the solution on the basis of consecutive montages of struc-
tures and functions» (Simondon 1964, p. 223). Moreover, he adds, «the on-
togenetic development itself can be considered as a mediation» (Simondon 
1992, p. 317). The concept of techno-aesthetics shows how far, in the course 
of the process of the human individual’s externalization, consecutive montages 
of structures and functions are established through the technical mediation 
with an environment: «it is for the very fact that the living being is an indi-
vidual being, embedding its associated environment, that the living being is 
able to invent; this agency of self-conditioning is at the basis of its capacity 
of producing objects that are in turn self-conditioning» (Simondon 1958, p. 
58). What binds together human beings, technique and environment can be 
defined as a “transductive relationship”.
The concept of transduction is borrowed from physics. With this term 
Simondon describes the relationship that binds together two or more el-
ements at the very moment of their constitution – the relationship being, 
however, a necessary condition for this constitution. Therefore, the relation 
among human beings, technique and environment is profoundly interactive 
and transformative for each of these three interrelated factors.
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Simondon’s work Du mode d ’existence des objets techniques (1958) allows to 
appreciate how this framework holds also for the techno-aesthetic sensitivity. 
In this text, Simondon states that a technical object can be considered as such 
only if it is endowed with a margin of indetermination, which allows it to «be 
sensitive to the information from outside». This open character enables the 
technical object’s interaction with the environment. What Simondon names 
“associated environment” is constituted within this relation of interaction, 
which he calls “concretization”:
The adaptation-concretization process is one which causes the birth of an en-
vironment, rather than being the result of an already established environment. 
[…] The invention happens because a jump is made and is justified by the 
relationship which is instituted within the environment it creates. […] It could 
be said that concretizing invention brings into being a techno-geographic en-
vironment, which is the condition upon which the possible functioning of the 
technical object depends. Therefore the technical object is the condition of it-
self as condition for the existence of this mixed environment that is at once 
technical and geographical. […] This environment, both technical and geo-
graphical, can be named “associated environment” (ibidem, p. 55).
The constitution of associated environments is among the most remark-
able consequences of all human technical externalizations, and it is based on 
the fact that human sensitivity is inherently a techno-aesthetic sensitivity. 
The individual reconfigures its environment through the technical object, but 
she is in turn implied in this reconfiguration. According to Simondon, «tech-
nology makes a relational function appear». Such a function concerns what 
he calls the relation of “couplage” that holds together «organism and environ-
ment, human being and world» (Simondon 2005, p. 84).
Culture et technique: the feedback between inside and outside
In a minor text, Culture et technique (1965), Simondon further emphasizes 
the issue of the transductive relation, in order to show how far the exclusion 
of technique from the domain of culture is incorrect, by analyzing what he 
calls «feedback effects».
 Here Simondon proposes an important definition of “technique”. “Tech-
nique” is when «man acts on the environment he is exploiting, transforming, 
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organizing; in this case, he doesn’t act on himself that through that charge which 
is the environment » (Simondon 2014, p. 317). Through the modifications im-
posed to the environment by technical mediations, human beings are able to 
act on themselves, becoming engaged in a process of individuation: a feedback 
is produced. As a consequence, technique cannot be conceived just as a
means, but rather as an act, a phase of an activity of relation between a human 
being and its environment. During this phase, the human being stimulates 
its environment by modifying it. Such a modification develops further, and 
the environment so modified offers the human being a new field for action, 
demanding a new adaptation [...]. Making its way through the environment, 
the energy of the technical gesture feeds back into the human being and allows 
him to change, to evolve (ibidem, p. 320).
For Simondon, such feedback effects, produced through an externaliza-
tion of the technical gesture, are effective on the human cognitive and sen-
sitive experience: «everything happens as if the bodily scheme of the human 
species had been modified, expanded, as if it had got new dimensions. The 
level of magnitude changes; the perceptual pattern enlarges and differenti-
ates. New schemes of intelligibility arise […]. It is embodiment» (ibidem, 
pp. 324-325). The feedback action realized by the technical gesture produces 
then «new schemes of intelligibility», i.e. a significant expansion of our cog-
nitive performances.
This expansion is followed, however, by an equally significant reconfigu-
ration of the human perceptual agency. As a result, human sensitivity is mod-
ified. The human bodily scheme expands and is enriched by new dimensions. 
Human «perceptual pattern» expands and increases its differentiations. These 
modifications, embodied into the individual, favor the emergence of new ap-
proaches both to the cognitive and sensorimotor environment. In this way, an 
important aspect of human evolution in its historical course emerges, that it 
occurs «through the technical gesture». Human and technological evolution 
are related by a mutual interaction. Such a mutual configuration entails also 
the modification, the expansion – sometimes, even the reduction – of our 
perceptual and sensitive asset, which is constantly reorganized within the 
technical environment to which it happens to be historically merged.
Simondon’s reflections on the human interactive relationship with the 
technique are crucial for the contemporary age, in which human sensitivity 
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is increasingly externalized and open. The relationship between “inside” and 
“outside” is in fact becoming more and more transductive within modern 
medial environments.
Furthermore, several of Simondon’s issues appear to echo some aspects of 
the Extended Mind Theory (EMT). While defining the human being as a 
«Natural Born Cyborg», Andy Clark – one of the most influential supporters 
of EMT – has not in mind humanoids empowered by mechanical devices 
and programmed brains. Rather, the very meaning of EMT emphasizes that 
human relationship to technique is eminently constitutive, species-specific, 
because of a naturally technically altered, i.e. techno-aesthetic, sensitivity. 
Clark refers to feedback processes that are available in the permeability be-
tween “inside” and “outside” environment and comprehend all human tech-
nical mediations:
we discern two distinct, but deeply interanimated, ways in which biological 
cognition leans on cultural and environmental structures. One way involves a 
developmental loop, in which exposure to external symbols adds something to 
the brain’s own inner toolkit. The other involves a persisting loop, in which on-
going neural activity becomes geared to the presence of specific external tools 
and media (Clark 2003, p. 78).
Clark insists on the strongly affective dimension of the feedback effects 
engendered by the way in which human beings interact with technologies, 
which is characterized by «some kind of local, circular process in which neu-
ral commands, motor actions, and sensory feedback are closely and continu-
ously correlated» (ibidem, p. 104). This makes possible to shape «the complex 
feedback loops that connect action-commands, bodily motions, environmen-
tal effects, and multisensory perceptual inputs. It is the two-way flow of influ-
ence between brain, body, and world that matters, and on the basis of which 
we construct (and constantly re-reconstruct) our sense of self, potential, and 
presence. The biological skin-bag has no special significance here. It is the 
flow that counts» (ibidem, p. 114).
Both Simondon and Clark, then, believe that relationship, interaction, 
is the pivot of these feedback effects. Technical mediations reorganize the 
human experience of the world.
115
Towards a Philosophy of Interaction
References
Clark A. 2003, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human 
Intelligence, Oxford University Press, New York-London.
Leroi-Gourhan A. 1993, Gesture and Speech, MIT Press, Cambridge-.
Simondon G. 1958, Du mode d ’existence des objets techniques, Aubier, Paris.
Simondon G. 1992, The Genesis of the Individual, in G. Simondon, Incorporations, ed. 
by J. Crary, S. Kwinter, Zone Books, New York, pp. 297-319.
Simondon G. 2005, L’invention dans les techniques, Éditions du Seuil, Paris.
Simondon G. 2012, On techno-aesthetics, in «Parrhesia», 14, pp. 1-8.
Simondon G. 2014, Culture et technique (1965), in G. Simondon, Sur la technique, 
Puf, Paris, pp. 315-329.
Stiegler B. 1998, Technics and Time, vol. 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford Univer-
sity Press, Stanford, Calif.

117
Mixed Systems and Interplay. 
Norbert Wiener meets Walter Benjamin
Francesco Restuccia
Norbert Wiener, the American mathematician (1894-1964), and Walter 
Benjamin, the German philosopher (1892-1940), never met and probably 
never heard of each other. However, their thoughts about the interaction 
between human beings and machines have a few interesting similarities. They 
are both concerned with the impact of technology on society1 and they con-
sider the second industrial revolution the turning point in the evolution of 
the relationship between human and machine.
However, they followed different routes and had different goals. Wiener 
approached technology from the perspective of control engineering theory 
and only after World War II started questioning it from an ethical point of 
view. Benjamin never studied any particular machine and only approached 
technology from an “anthropological” perspective, considering especially the 
way human beings deal with their own production, including crafts and art 
(techne). The viewpoints Wiener and Benjamin share are not many; yet they 
are significant for anyone wishing to work on these issues in an interdisci-
plinary way.
The turning point
In The Human Use of Human Beings, his first book about the ethical and 
sociological implications of cybernetics and technology, Norbert Wiener 
distinguishes «the older machines, and in particular the older attempts to 
produce automata», from the «modern automatic machines such as the con-
trolled missile» (Wiener 1950, p. 22). The former functioned «on a closed 
clockwork basis» and did not have any interaction with the environment. The 
latter possess sense organs, which enable them to receive messages from, and 
interact with, the environment. If the engine is the essential element of the 
1 The social implications of cybernetics are evident also in its etymology: the term, that Wiener 
himself proposed, is based on the Greek word kybernétes (steersman, captain), which is related to 
the Latin word gubernum (government).
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first industrial revolution, substituting the labor of slaves and animals with 
the energy of the machine, the second industrial revolution can find its icon 
in the photoelectric cell (ibidem, p. 23). A few pages further Wiener describes 
these new machines through two general features:
One is that they are machines to perform some definite task or tasks, and there-
fore must possess effector organs (analogous to arms and legs in human beings) 
with which such tasks can be performed. The second point is that they must be 
en rapport with the outer world by sense organs, such as photoelectric cells and 
thermometers, which not only tell them what the existing circumstances are, 
but enable them to record the performance or nonperformance of their own 
tasks. This last function, as we have seen, is called feedback, the property of being 
able to adjust future conduct by past performance (ibidem, pp. 32-33).
The automata – the older machines – only execute what they are pro-
grammed for and they need humans to regularly adjust their functioning. On 
the contrary, machines provided with self-regulation systems – modern ma-
chines – are not only more efficient, but more autonomous: one can now be 
surprised by the performances of a machine such as a chess-player computer.
A similar distinction between a dependent and an autonomous technolo-
gy can be found in Walter Benjamin’s well-known essay The Work of Art in the 
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1936). This essay is much more than a 
reflection on art; Benjamin thinks anew about the way technology transforms 
our experience of the world. Even though human life has always been some-
how technical, two kinds of technology can be recognized, according to the 
sort of interaction they establish with human beings: an older one based on 
mastery over nature, and a second one based on interplay.
Whereas the former made the maximum possible use of human beings, the 
latter reduces their use to the minimum. The achievements of the first tech-
nology might be said to culminate in human sacrifice; those of the second, in 
the remote-controlled aircraft which needs no human crew. The results of the 
first technology are valid once and for all (it deals with irreparable lapse or 
sacrificial death, which holds good for eternity). The results of the second are 
wholly provisional (it operates by means of experiments and endlessly varied 
test procedures) (Benjamin 2008, p. 26).
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The first technology originated in ancient times, but far from being restrict-
ed to the past, it is still present today, every time something is accomplished 
«once and for all». The second technology, on the contrary, is quite recent, 
because it needs receptors to function by itself, reducing the use of human 
beings to the minimum. Obviously, a remote-controlled aircraft is not yet 
completely autonomous, since it needs a ground control, but it is considered 
by Benjamin a first step in this direction.
It is remarkable that Wiener and Benjamin employ the same vocabulary 
in addressing this issue: they both are interested in the new machines not 
for their efficiency, but because they make a «human use of human beings» 
possible (Wiener 1950), which means reducing «their use to the minimum» 
(Benjamin 2008, p. 26). The aim of first technology is to transform nature, 
while the second technology aims at functioning within the world: the for-
mer tries to adapt nature to itself, the latter tries to adapt itself to the world.
The second technology operates by «endlessly varied test procedures», in 
an experimental way. Benjamin considers tests a distinctive feature of the way 
of living of our society, in sport, in acting performances, and in the work pro-
cess that, «especially since it has been standardized by the assembly line, daily 
generates countless mechanized tests» (ibidem, p. 30). Test performances are 
based on a process similar to a feedback effect2: the behaviour is periodically 
compared with the result to be achieved, and the success or failure of this re-
sult changes the behaviour of the performer. This is why the results of second 
technology «are wholly provisional». According to Benjamin tests confer to 
any act a playful dimension. «The origin of the second technology lies at the 
point where, by an unconscious ruse, human beings first began to distance 
themselves from nature. It lies, in other words, in play» (ibidem, p. 26).
Interplay
One uses the older machines, but one plays with the new ones. Interacting 
with the new machines has a recreational aspect that is not present in the 
clockwork-like machines, since these latter are foreseeable. The behaviour of 
the apparatus does not depend entirely on our inputs, but also on its inacces-
2 Baudrillard 1993 compares Benjamin’s concept of test performance to feedback, but unlike 
Wiener, he considers a feedback-based society a non-democratic one.
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sible internal program, and especially on the environment, and it is therefore 
partly unpredictable for the user. This potential surprise, or, as Benjamin calls 
it, «the shock effect», creates an emotional expectation and induces «height-
ened attention» (ibidem, p. 53): the one who interacts with an apparatus is 
both alert, since he is expecting a partly unpredictable result, and distracted, 
zerstreut, which in German also means entertained. The kind of interaction 
Benjamin is thinking of is not an intellectual one: he writes about a «physical 
shock effect» and «primarily tactile» distracting elements (ibidem, p. 39).
The playful aspect of the second technology is not restricted to enter-
tainment, but it also includes learning, just as children’s games have both a 
recreational and an educational dimension. Playing with the new machines, 
the user improves his «know-how» (Wiener 1950, p. 183): the interaction 
with the apparatus is a «true training ground» (Benjamin 2008, p. 41). But 
what do we learn? What do we need to be trained for? Of course, we need 
to learn how to handle the machines themselves. However, one needs to be 
trained not only to use the machines properly, but especially «to preserve 
one’s humanity in the face of the apparatus  […], for the majority of city 
dwellers, throughout the workday in offices and factories, have to relinquish 
their humanity in the face of an apparatus» (ibidem, p. 31). The loss of hu-
manity, according to both our thinkers, is due to the lack of responsibility, 
which has to be understood in the sense of capability to respond.
I have spoken of machines, but not only of machines having brains of brass and 
thews of iron. When human atoms are knit into an organization in which they 
are used, not in their full right as responsible human beings, but as cogs and 
levers and rods, it matters little that their raw material is flesh and blood. What 
is used as an element in a machine, is in fact an element in the machine (Wiener 
1950, p. 185).
Wiener, just like Benjamin, thinks that only a machine, which is able to 
adapt itself to its environment, can establish with the user a “human” inter-
action, but the user also needs to learn how to dialogue with it. The human 
being is testing the apparatus, while the apparatus is testing the human per-
formance: they are both learning from each other.
The main example of a learning apparatus, in God & Golem Inc. (Wiener 
1964), is a computer that was developed by A. L. Samuel of IBM Corpora-
tion in 1959, and that could play checkers. The computer, just like the human 
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player, improves its performances by its own experience of the actions of the 
other player (Figure 1). In this case, it is apparent that the human is not using 
the machine, as the computer is not using the human being. Use is a term that 
belongs to the first technology, while at this stage we should rather talk of 
interplay. «The first technology really sought to master nature, whereas the 
second aims rather at an interplay between nature and humanity» (Benjamin 
2008, p. 26). Zwischenspiel in German means interplay, ludic interaction, but 
it is also employed to mean an intermezzo, a musical interlude that separates 
two parts and at the same time relates them.
Figure 1. The Mechanical Turk, Von Kempelen’s fake Automaton Chess 
Player, from Racknitz 1789, quoted by Benjamin 1968, p. 253.
Mixed systems
The relationship between human and machine establishes a new unity 
that includes the two components and the environment: the camera is con-
nected to the photographer and the photographed subject, the car to the 
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driver and the street. Modern machines, according to Wiener, are «systems 
of a mixed nature, involving both human and mechanical parts» (Wiener 
1964, p. 76).
Technical apparatuses connected to an organism are usually called pros-
theses. Wiener distinguishes them into three kinds. A simple, mechanical 
substitution of a missing limb, such as a wooden leg, is the most trivial case. A 
more interesting one is the prosthesis that substitutes for muscles and dam-
aged sense organs, such as a robot hand connected to the nervous system. But 
the third example is the most important: «this type of engineering need not 
to be confined to the replacement of parts that we have lost. There is a pros-
thesis of parts which we do not have and which we never had» (ibidem). On 
our airplanes, we have the wings of an eagle, thanks to our sonars we navigate 
like dolphins. This enhancement is not only for the single individual, but also 
for groups of people and for the whole society.
In a similar way Benjamin writes that a «new, historically unique collec-
tive» is born, «which has its organs in the new technology» (Benjamin 2008, 
p. 45). To refer to the connection between this new collective and its tech-
nological organs, its prostheses of parts which it never had, Benjamin uses 
the term innervation that he borrows from Freud’s early writings. It means 
both the distribution of nerves in an animal to any of its parts and the act 
of stimulating an activity in any of its organs. This deep connection is still 
more a project than a reality, and that is why Benjamin writes about «efforts 
at innervation»: a stimulation that expects a response – a playful training 
again. «Just as a child who has learned to grasp stretches out its hand for the 
moon as it would for a ball, so humanity, in its efforts at innervation, sets its 
sights as much on currently utopian goals as on within reach» (ibidem). A 
seemingly useless gesture like stretching out one’s hand for the moon may 
actually reveal itself as a training that will eventually help learning how to 
better grasp a ball, but at the same time it reveals that one could grasp much 
more than a ball.
Dealing with apparatus also teaches them that technology will release them 
from their enslavement to the powers of the apparatus only when humanity’s 
whole constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which the 
second technology has set free (ibidem, pp. 26-27).
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Because this technology aims at liberating human beings from drudgery, the 
individual suddenly sees his scope for play, his field of action, immeasurably 
expanded. He does not yet know his way around this space. But already he 
registers his demands on it (ibidem, p. 45).
Benjamin offers two examples of second technology: the remote-con-
trolled aircraft and the movie camera. They both require interplay and estab-
lish together with the human being a mixed system: they expand the human 
field of action (Spielraum: a space for playing) as prosthesis of parts humans 
never had. Thanks to his new mechanical eye the human being can now ex-
tend movements with slow motion, and expand space with enlargement, dis-
closing his «optical unconscious» (ibidem, p. 37).
Figure 2. Frame of Dziga Vertov’s  Man with a Movie Camera, 1929, a 
director quoted by Benjamin 1968, p. 231.
Know-how and know-what
The more technology is automatized, the more our field of action is 
extended. Do we still need to feel responsible for a completely automatized 
technology? Does it «take over from us our need for difficult thinking»? 
Only if we believe that it thinks for us and not with us, we will make this 
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mistake. Automation is «literal-minded»: a modern apparatus will reach 
its goal with unforeseen strategies, but it will only reach that goal. «A 
goal-seeking mechanism will not necessarily seek our goals, unless we de-
sign it for that purpose» (Wiener 1964, p. 63). The unpredictable results 
of such a machine are very interesting, because they show us something we 
did not think of; however, this can also be very dangerous. That is why the 
programming of an apparatus is a very important task.
If you’re playing a war game with a certain conventional interpretation of vic-
tory, victory will be the goal at any cost, even that of the extermination of your 
own side, unless the condition of survival is explicitly contained in the defini-
tion of victory according to which you program the machine (ibidem, p. 60).
Automation should not be a way of delegating our concerns to ma-
chines; on the contrary, we should learn to use our new extended field of 
action to face these concerns in a new playful way together with the ap-
paratus. «Vital questions affecting the individual – questions of love and 
death which had been buried by the first technology – once again press for 
solutions» (Benjamin 2008, p. 45). What we should try to understand in 
our interplay with the second technology is what we want, no matter if it is 
or it is not within reach.
Our papers have been making a great deal of American “know-how” ever since 
we had the misfortune to discover the atomic bomb. There is one quality more 
important than “know-how” and we cannot accuse the United States of any 
undue amount of it. This is “know-what” by which we determine not only how 
to accomplish our purposes, but what our purposes are to be (Wiener 1950, 
p. 183).
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Only Connect. The Contribution of Michael Tomasello 
to the Machine-Organism Symbiosis
Francesco De Bei
In his classic 1960 paper, L. Licklider argued the importance of a “sym-
biosis” man-computer in order to increase the human intellect, thus freeing 
it from tedious tasks. Today, after more than fifty years, we can count on 
powerful personal computers, huge online databases and, of course, a ubiqui-
tous Internet. Undoubtedly, the power of our intellect has been increased. It 
is, however, equally true that, today, computers and technology have ceased 
being simple tools that can lift us from demanding tasks, and are entrenched 
in a much more radical way in everyday life. That is, they have become an 
integral part of the environment.
Over the same period of time it was not only the concept of computer to 
undergo a transformation, but also the concept of the body has been radically 
changed. Both clinical and developmental research (e.g., Beebe, Lachmann 
2002; Siegel 2012), and cognitive science, especially that ensemble of proce-
dures and research programs that go under the name of Embodied Cognition 
(Shapiro 2011), have taught us to review the boundary between inside and 
outside, to conceive of a situated mind, simultaneously composed of internal 
and external processes. In other words, assuming a mind without an environ-
ment equates to investigating an empty shell: it is what takes place between 
individuals and in the environment that becomes the matter of the mental 
register. That same matter which, in turn, the mind rearranges and trans-
forms, influencing the exchange with the outside; which, once again, becomes 
a form of internal information, and so on.
It is clear that this profound change has made the idea of a symbiosis be-
tween machine and organism something very different – and probably more 
fundamental – from the one advocated by Licklider. It is therefore legitimate 
to ask: how technology and technological objects, increasingly present in the 
environment and in social practices, can be thought of as an extension of the 
body and of human cognition?
The advantage of the evolutionary approach to the study of the “extended” 
quality of human cognition is the ability to shift the question from as (the 
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thought is formed) to how (it has evolved). This allows locating the point of 
inquiry in the interaction between the individual and the environment. The 
mind, as we study it today, has evolved – this the thesis of Tomasello (2008, 
2014, 2016) – first as an adaptation to a physical environment and then to a 
social environment. In other words, the unique quality of human cognition 
involves not only an epistemic problem, but (mainly) an ontological one.
From the individual to the shared intentionality
The question from which Tomasello moves can be formulated in this 
way: what is unique about human thought? His answer lies in the concept of 
shared intentionality: in the entire animal kingdom, only humans are capable 
of building a network of connections and cooperative motivations with other 
members of the group. This is due to their ability to empathize; a capacity 
that, together with the disposition to establish a bond of attachment, reflects 
an innate predisposition to coordinate thought and behaviour on a coopera-
tive and mutual basis (Bowlby 1969; Tomasello 2009). But to understand 
how this capability has led to the development of a mind, it is necessary to 
start from the kind of cognition present in our non-human ancestors (To-
masello 2014).
For a body to adapt to an unpredictable environment, cognitive and deci-
sion-making processes are required that enable it to recognize new situations 
and to adapt to unpredictable events. Faced with a new situation, it must be 
able first to identify the causal and/or the underlying intentional relations; 
only from this understanding can then arise an appropriate behavioural re-
sponse. A cognitively competent body therefore operates according to the 
classic belief-desire model of the rational action: it must recognize situations 
that are causally relevant with respect to its aims and values and select appro-
priate actions to satisfy them.
This flexible and self-regulated cognitive functioning, characteristic of 
all great apes and our pre-human ancestors, is what Tomasello (2014) calls 
individual intentionality. According to this model, we can say that there is 
thought when an organism tries to solve a problem (to achieve a goal) not 
acting directly, but by imagining what would happen in the given situation 
if it acted in a certain way. In order to possess an individual intentionality 
an organism must be able (Tomasello 2014): 1) to cognitively represent 
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off-line potential perceptual experiences; 2) to simulate and make inferences, 
transforming these representations on a causal/intentional/logical level; and 
3) to self-monitor these simulated experiences and to assess their specific 
behavioural outcomes, so as to choose the most appropriate one. It is at this 
stage that selective pressure acts, because the success or failure of a specific 
behavioural decision indirectly exposes the underlying processes of represen-
tation, simulation and self-monitoring to the test of natural selection.
It should be remarked that, given the action of selective pressure, the 
content of these cognitive representations is inevitably linked to the external 
environment. If goals and values are represented as desired situations, then 
the organism must turn its attention to the perceived environment towards 
situations relevant to those goals and values. The sight of a banana tree and 
the absence of predators, for example, represents for a chimpanzee in search 
of food a relevant situation to decide what to do. Given that for an individual 
intentionality relevance is represented by all those situations that are oppor-
tunities or obstacles to the pursuit of the aims of the organism, the determi-
nation of relevant situations calls into question the whole way of life of an 
organism1 (Tomasello 2014).
This form of rationality is the kind of cognition needed by organisms, 
such as apes, with competitive interactions with their environment. The hu-
man way of life, on the contrary, is organized in a much more cooperative 
way. According to the hypothesis of Tomasello, it was the selective pressure 
exerted by these forms of cooperative sociability that turned individual inten-
tionality and cognition in shared cognition and intentionality.
This key step occurred thousands of years ago, when an ecological change 
that reduced the possibility to obtain food has forced the first human beings 
to choose between procuring food together or go hungry. This new form 
of interdependence has led to extend the sense of empathy beyond the cir-
cle of relatives and friends, to include the companions of collaboration, and 
brought about new forms of cooperation that required, for their coordina-
tion, new forms of cooperative communication which, in turn,  produced new 
types of cognitive representation, inference and self-monitoring – i.e., a new 
way of thinking.
1 This idea is directly linked to the Gibsonian notion of affordances, but is much broader, as it in-
cludes not only the opportunities for action offered directly from the environment, but also many 
situations that are relevant to the organism in a more indirect way. In the case of the chimpanzee, 
for example, the absence of a predator is an indirect affordance.
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Unlike individual intentionality, shared intentionality is defined by aims 
and values  of both participants in the interaction – for example, the will to 
hunt together – and by their mutual knowledge or “common ground”; that is, 
to know that that is what you both want. The cognitive model characterized 
by shared intentionality has therefore a two-level structure (conjunction and 
individuality). In a collaborative activity, each individual is both the “we” that 
pursues a joint aim and, at the same time, the individual who has an own role 
and perspective (Tomasello 2014). In other words, in intentionally shared 
activity the individual understands what his/her are doing from an “overall 
overview”, not looking at the other from the outside; rather, on one side, 
every individual represents himself the role and the perspective of the other, 
and on the other side, he imagines how the other is imagining its role and 
its perspective2.
As pointed out by Tomasello (2014), this change has led to the need for 
new forms of cooperative communications, which have elicited new forms of 
thought, driven by the “socialization” of all three components of the thinking 
process: representation, inference and self-monitoring. Regarding represen-
tation, the decisive innovation is that both participants in the communicative 
interaction have to take into account each other’s perspective on the situa-
tion. Therefore, the act of communication represents prospectively the scene 
for the recipient. Inferences in collaborative communications have become 
socially recursive: individuals make inferences about other’s intentions re-
garding their intentional states. Finally, the socialization of self-monitoring 
is achieved by imagining oneself in the role of the recipient who tries to 
understand, in order to check whether the communicative act is formulated 
correctly and is likely to be understood.
Briefly, the transition from an individual to a shared intentionality leads 
to the development of a cognitive model oriented to the group. Moreover, 
and more importantly, the cognitive representation, inference and self-mon-
itoring at the basis of this mode of thinking is not based (primarily) on the 
physical environment, but in established practices of group collaboration. 
They refer to a social ontology.
2 It should be noted that at the level of the proximal (psychological) mechanisms: a) the awareness 
of interdependence does not need to have any role in the decision making process of the individual; 
the proximal motivation may simply be to cooperate with anyone who has certain characteristics 
or is in a certain context; and, b) the co-operative act is not motivated by any previous specific act, 
but only in order to preserve the relationship.
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In summary, the concepts of individual and of shared intentionality pos-
sess characteristics that naturally provide the cognition with an “extended” 
quality. In a cognition based on individual intentionality, thinking takes place 
within the relationship between the individual (the body) and the physical 
environment of space and quantity (Tomasello, 2014). Analogical infer-
ences such as bigger/smaller, higher/lower, more/less are based on this kind 
of cognition (e.g., Lakoff, Johnson 1999). In the framework of shared in-
tentionality, inferences are based not on the relationship among physical en-
tities, but between an entity and a wider process or event in which it has a 
role (Markman, Stillwell 2001). Furthermore, the empathetic base on 
which rests this form of thought is able to create a “connection” between the 
members of a group that extends beyond the physical presence. Several clin-
ical data show the impact that the exclusion from the group has on the indi-
vidual’s mental functioning. It is well known, for example, that the perceived 
loss of belonging to their group – namely a break in the relationship of inter-
dependence – has a negative impact on the individual’s ability to self-regulate 
psychologically and physically (e.g., Cacioppo, Patrick 2009). In a broad 
sense, what these data suggest is consistent with the assumptions of Tomasel-
lo: that is, a break in cooperation – a “disconnection” from the group – can in 
itself produce severe perturbations in individual mental functioning.
Only connect
The increasingly widespread dissemination of constantly “connected” 
technological objects – a “network” of information and people – has trans-
formed today’s machines from something able to perform demanding or 
boring tasks to a medium capable of supporting and boosting just those abil-
ities to connection that Tomasello detects at the basis of human cognition. If 
technological objects based on a “in network” functioning – that is, connected 
to other systems or to Internet – appear much closer to the analogy of mental 
functioning, on the other side it is exactly this feature that makes them much 
more entrenched and in “symbiosis” with individuals. And this in two ways.
Firstly, the amount of information we can access today is vastly larger 
than in the past. Internet, as well as the so-called Internet of Things, have 
greatly increased the number of operations that can be left to technological 
objects and the control that we can have on the environment. This change, 
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according to Tomasello, directly involves cognition. In fact, the exponential 
increase of information and control over the physical objects represents, for 
the “individual intentionality”, part of a decision-making process devoted to 
the calculation of opportunities and obstacles relevant to the behavioural de-
cision. In other word, what has increased significantly is the amount of direct 
and indirect affordances.
Secondly, the new technological objects provide humans with the ability 
to communicate constantly with a growing number of individuals and virtual 
communities (from Facebook to WhatsApp chat), enhancing sharing and 
collaborative problem-solving. This affects directly the cognitive abilities at 
the base of a shared intentionality. The result is that the number of recipients 
(individual and group) on which the inference, representation and self-mon-
itoring is constantly applied has grown dramatically, leading to an increased 
number of “common land” (from the simple chat to a wider virtual commu-
nity) to which individuals are constantly “connected.”
The machine-body symbiosis today must be thought of as more profound 
and radical than it was conceivable fifty years ago. The dramatic depth at-
tained by this new machine could produce, along the lines of Tomasello ap-
proach, not just an increase in the externalization of cognitive processes, but 
also a change in the functioning of the mind. In fact, this new form of in-
teraction among individual, technology and environment affects directly the 
inferences and representations processes underlying human cognition. The 
issue at stake is evidently to find a new balance in the growing machine-body 
symbiosis, by developing new forms of adaptation in an environment increas-
ingly saturated of technological objects, and, on a shorter term, to address the 
basic need to maintain a private and independent space.
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evolutionary approaches to the explanation of cognitive capabilities and intelligent 
behaviour are concerned.
Elisa Binda
PhD in Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
Email: elisa.binda@uniroma1.it
Towards a Philosophy of Interaction. The Relation between Organism, 
Technique and Environment in Gilbert Simondon
In recent years, the work of Gilbert Simondon has been rediscovered and increasin-
gly appreciated as a valuable contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate 
about technique. I move in particular from two texts, Du mode d ’existence des objets 
techniques (1958) and Sur la technique (2014), in order to highlight the characteristic 
relationship of mutual implication that exists for Simondon among technical object, 
organism and environment.
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Take Another Little Piece of my Heart: a Note on Bridging Cognition and 
Emotions
Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges science to be 
more reflective. This dynamics characterized the process of the “discovery of the ar-
tificial”: in the early days of Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers 
aimed at making machines more cognizant while setting up a framework to better 
understand human intelligence.
By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, as AI has become more concerned 
with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (machine) learning, reasoning, vision, 
and action. However, the field suffers actually from a chasm between two formerly 
integrated aspects. One is the engineering endeavour devoted to the development of 
applications. The other is the philosophical debate addressing questions concerning 
the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can be crucial for a deeper un-
derstanding of minds.
An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Traditionally, 
computer science, psychological and philosophical research restricted themselves 
to the investigation of mental processes that do not involve mood, emotions and 
feelings, in spite of Simon’s early caveat that a general theory of cognition must 
incorporate the influences of emotion. Recent neurobiological findings and techno-
logical advances show that the time is ripe to seriously address this promising, albeit 
controversial, opportunity.
Nicole Dalia Cilia
PhD in Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
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Understand Me or Duplicate Me? Levels of Explanation in Artificial Meth-
odology
The development of new technologies has caused a proliferation of the use of “machi-
nes” in various fields. A well-programmed machine is able, if not to replace humans, 
to assist them in many tasks and to explain many cognitive processes. Since the 1940s, 
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cognitive scientists have followed the methodology to reproduce and investigate the 
mechanisms of cognitive functions by means of a kind of artificial simulation known 
as model-oriented simulation (Cordeschi 2002). In recent years, a number of research 
programs whose goal is to reproduce the entire human brain seem to have changed 
the methodology, by introducing the  data-oriented simulation  (Datteri, Laudisa 
2016). I address some of the issues related to the evolution and epistemological im-
plications of simulative methods in cognitive science. Furthermore, I will analyze 
the difference between these methodologies, in order to investigate the possibility of 
including the data-oriented simulation in the model-oriented simulation.
Francesco De Bei
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Only Connect. The Contribution of Michael Tomasello to the Machine-or-
ganism Symbiosis
In recent years, the idea of a human-machine symbiosis able to lift individuals from 
burdensome tasks has undergone profound change. Not only because we can now rely 
on powerful personal computers, online databases and the Internet; but mostly becau-
se these technological tools have stopped being simple objects capable of performing 
mechanical tasks, and have become integral part of the environment. At the same 
time, also the concept of the body has undergone a radical revision. Both clinical and 
developmental research and cognitive science have led to rethinking the boundary 
between inside and outside, and to conceive of the mind as situated and simultane-
ously composed of internal and external processes. Moving from the evolutionary 
hypotheses developed in recent years by Michael Tomasello, this contribution focuses 
as well on how the meaning of a symbiosis between body and machines has been 
changing, as on the impact that an environment increasingly saturated of technology 
can have on mental functioning.
Mattia Della Rocca
PhD in History of Science, Dept. of Civilisations and Forms of Knowledge, Univer-
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From Brains as Machines to Machines as Brains. A Short Historical and 
Epistemological Reflection on the Simulation and “Reverse Engineering” 
of the Central Nervous System
21st century “big brain science” initiatives – especially the EU Flagship Human Brain 
Project – overtly aim to achieve a simulation of the central nervous system by “reverse 
engineering”. However, a reflection is needed on the theoretical and epistemologi-
cal assumptions which support this endeavour, and on the implications of adopting 
an engineering perspective in neuroscience for the contemporary Western discourse 
about the brain/mind system. In this contribution, I highlight the historical and epi-
stemological origins of this peculiar perspective, focusing on some earlier electronic 
and engineering models of both the structure and the functioning of the brain – a 
paradigm shift that was tightly linked in neuroscience to the first attempts to develop 
a “neuro-technological transfer”. Challenging the idea that the actual approach really 
represents a novelty in the panorama of neuroscience helps understanding the major 
criticisms to present-day brain simulations, and elucidating the role of extra-scientific 
factors in the development of this technological and scientific trend.
Simone Guidi
PhD in Philosophy. Lecturer at NABA (New Fine Arts Academy), Milan, and Mem-
bro Colaborador of Instituto de Estudos Filósoficos, Universidade de Coimbra, Por-
tugal.
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Mechanism “Prehistory” and the Strange Case of Cureau de La Chambre
This article deals with the concept of “mechanism” from a historical point of view, 
focusing on its relationship with the evolution of hylomorphism in the 17th century. 
I try to address the following questions: is mechanism structurally bound to materia-
lism or does it rather represent a form of complete determinism, reconcilable with an 
“updated” version of hylomorphism? In the first part of the essay, I make the point 
that the very notion of “mechanism” must be clarified by means of a distinction betwe-
en Boylean experimental mechanism and what Daniel Garber has called the “pre-hi-
story of the Mechanical Philosophy”. My aim is to highlight how the deterministic 
(and nominalistic) hylomorphism developed in the 17th Century came quite close to 
mechanism. In this framework, I present the ‘strange case’ of Marin Cureau de La 
Chambre (1594-1669), which represents a characteristic compromise – based on the 
possibility of a not bodily extension – between a deterministic mechanization of the 
lower functions of the vegetative and sensitive soul and Campanella’s panpsychism.
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The Organism, Maker of Machines
The contribution deals with Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of technique, addres-
sing in particular two of its crucial aspects: technique-science (the technological pro-
blem) and organism-machine (the biological problem). Since the 1930s, Canguilhem 
develops a critique to the positivist theory that he synthetized as “knowing in order 
to predict and predicting in order to act”. His argument is that the technical act is 
not a mere application of scientific principles, but rather the necessary condition for 
them: the theory is in fact the result of the reflection on the failures of the technical 
act. I also address the topic of the assimilation of the organism to the machine and 
of the use of this analogy in biology. Canguilhem in fact reverses the traditional re-
lation between machine and organism: while it is true that the living being produces 
mechanical processes, it is however far more relevant that the machines, on their turn, 
are capable of adaptation, learning and interaction with the environment through 
processes of trial and error, based on features (organization and plasticity) once con-
sidered distinctive of the living beings. The paper aims at showing the philosophical 
consequences of this reversal.
Alessandra Passariello
PhD student in Philosophy, Dept. Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
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Early Organicism and its Juggling Machines: Further from Nature, Closer 
to Organisms
The article analyses the origin of the machine-organism debate with respect to the 
rise of the Organicist movement in the late 1920s. I argue that a better understan-
ding of the Organicist divide between organisms and machines can be only grasped 
if we extend our analysis to the broader domain of relations between organisms, 
machines and natural phenomena. In particular, by analyzing two of von Bertalanf-
fy’s earlier texts (1933, 1952), I attempt to show that early Organicism assumed an 
epistemological proximity between machines and natural systems, while the ma-
chine-organism divide was rather instrumental in rejecting the physical-chemical 
reducibility of organisms. I highlight the role of cybernetics as the epistemological 
turning point in the loosening of the relationship between machines and natural 
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phenomena, and how this loosening paved the way to the rapprochement between 
organisms and machines.
Francesco Restuccia
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Mixed Systems and Interplay. Norbert Wiener meets Walter Benjamin
The article explores Wiener and Benjamin’s views about the interaction between hu-
man beings and machines, highlighting some similarities. Despite their different areas 
of interest, they both recognize two kinds of technology, according to the sort of 
interaction each entertains with human beings: an older one based on mastery and a 
second one based on interplay. The latter may eventually lead to «systems of a mixed 
nature, involving both human and mechanical parts», a new collective «which has its 
organs in the new technology».
The emphasis the two authors share on interaction supports a view of automation that 
does not delegate human concerns to machines, but encourages the use of the new 
extended field of action to face these concerns in a new playful fashion together with 
the apparatus. In a society where machines are more and more able to pursue their 
own aims, human beings must therefore become even more responsible in setting and 
preserving the specifically human aims.
Luca Tonetti
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Dept. Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
Email: tonetti.luca@gmail.com
Machines and Diseases: Giorgio Baglivi and his Mechanistic Physiopathol-
ogy
The Croatian physician Giorgio Baglivi (1668-1707), professor of anatomy and sur-
gery and, from 1702, of theoretical medicine at the Studium Urbis, is traditionally con-
sidered a leading representative of the Italian “iatromechanism”. Iatromechanism (or 
iatrophysics) is a 17th-century medical tradition, which attempts to explain normal 
and diseased states of the body in mechanistic terms, according to the laws of physics.
In a famous passage from De praxi medica, quoted by Canguilhem in Machine et or-
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ganisme, Baglivi compares the parts of the body to different kinds of physical devi-
ces, such as retorts, hydraulic pipes, springs, ropes, and so on. However, despite this 
radical reductionism, Baglivi also realizes that diseases cannot be entirely reduced to 
physics, the morbid states of the body being something completely different from 
malfunctioning of machines. Baglivi in fact rejects the use of mechanical devices for 
the treatment of diseases; in his view, the improvement of medicine only depends on 
the practice itself.
Therefore, Baglivi recognizes, albeit not explicitly, the limits of iatromechanism in pa-
thology, proving that this category needs a thorough revision. In this paper, I examine 
the role of mechanics in Baglivi’s medicine, by analysing, in particular, the problem of 
the relationship between solids and fluids in the body.
Valentina Trombetta
PhD student in Cognitive Science, Graduate School of Robotics, University of 
Freiburg, Germany.
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The Role of Emotions and Intrinsic Motivations on Decision-Making: a 
Comparison between Natural and Artificial Systems
Decision-making is a cognitive process that involves a choice, that is the capacity 
of a system to select one of alternative options. This is important for the survival of 
animals in their environment, but also for human beings facing moral dilemmas and 
finally for robots, to survive in a specific environment as well as to simulate real hu-
man behaviours. Different levels of analysis are necessary for developing a complete 
explanation of this process: the neurological level of the brain areas involved, the 
psychological one for the role of emotions and intrinsic motivations on choice, the 
philosophical analysis of the intentions as cause of a choice and/or an action, and 
robotics to compare the behaviour of natural and artificial systems. All these features 
are linked together within a theoretical enactive and dynamical framework. I will try 
to show how current research addresses the scope of comparing the role of emotions 
and intrinsic motivations in natural and artificial systems.
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Wired Bodies
New Perspectives on the Machine-Organism Analogy
relationship between human sciences and life sciences and practices, and to stimulate 
new theoretical perspectives capable of supporting the communication and interaction 
Wired Bodies
New Perspectives on 
the Machine-Organism Analogy
Editors  
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Western philosophy and science. Notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, it 
hides complex epistemological issues about the status of both organism and 
machine and the nature of their interaction. What is the real object of this 
analogy: organisms as a whole, their parts or, rather, bodily functions? How 
can the machine serve as a model for interpreting biological phenomena, 
cognitive processes, or more broadly the social and cultural transformations of 
the relations between individuals, and between individuals and the environ-
Wired bodies. New perspectives on the machine-organism analogy provides the 
reader with some of the latest perspectives on this vast debate, addressing 
three major topics: 1) the development of a ‘mechanistic’ framework in 
medicine and biology; 2) the methodological issues underlying the use of 
‘simulation’ in cognitive science; 3) the interaction between humans and 
machines according to 20th century epistemology.
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